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2.1 Introduction
Interest in business cycles is itself subject to a wavelike movement, waxing
during and after periods of turbulence and depression, waning in periods of
substantial stability and continuing growth. I At time, confidence in govern-
ment institutions and actions persuaded many that cyclical instability had
ceased to be a serious problem. Thus in the early heyday of the Federal Re-
serve System, 1922-29, monetary policies were expected to help maintain
prosperity. In the 1960s, the late heyday ofKeynesian economics, fiscal fine-
tuning evoked similar hopes.
The present is another time of disillusionment-now extending to both
types ofstabilization policy. The sequence ofserious worldwide recessions in
the last decade soon refuted the perennially attractive idea that business cycles
had become obsolete. Beyond that, the credibility ofboth Keynesian and mo-
netarist explanations has diminished. Once again, the apparent failure of old
solutions prompts the profession to pay more attention to the continued exis-
tence ofbusiness cycles.
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1. This is well illustrated in the early literature, which focused on the episodes ofcommercial
crises, but it is also reflected in the timing of later, classical studies of the nature and causes of
business cycles at large. There is little doubt about the impetus provided in this context by the
major depressions of the late 1830s, 1870s, 1890s, 1907-8, 1920-21, and most strikingly the
1930s.
2021 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
The rediscovery of an important subject is always welcome, even if long
overdue. However, much ofthe recent work has neglected the long history of
both the phenomena ofmajor economic fluctuations and their interpretations,
concentrating instead on contemporary theoretical and policy controversies,
mainly in the United States. An overview ofselected literature will attempt to
demonstrate that this myopia is costly and needs to be corrected.
The study of business cycles is almost coextensive with short-term macro-
dynamics and it has a large interface with the economics of growth, money,
inflation, and expectations. The literature is huge; its level of difficulty is in
general high. This survey attempts to provide a historical background and
outline the evolution of thought leading to the recent developments in theory
and related evidence. The coverage is extensive, yet ofnecessity much is left
out, including theories that are largely concerned with unemployment and
inflation, much less with business cycles directly. 2
In particular, no attempt can be made here to discuss in any detail the statis-
tical and historical work on the observed regularities and idiosyncrasies of
business cycles and their possible long-term changes. This empirical literature
is rich and important: it deserves a separate review. After all, it is the "stylized
facts" which it provides that ought to be explained by the theory. Those main
facts are summarized in section 2.2, but with a minimum of references and
commentary.
Section 2.3 discusses the main elements ofolder theories, before and after
the Great Depression, and proceeds to more recent models driven by changes
in investment, credit, and price-cost-profit relations. Most of these theories
and models are primarily endogenous and deterministic. Exogenous factors
and stochastic elements are introduced early in section 2.4.
The sections that follow deal, first, with the monetarist interpretation of
business cycles, then with the newer equilibrium models with price misper-
ceptions and intertemporal substitution. The route leads generally from
"adaptive" to "rational" expectations. The approach is generally monetarist in
the sense ofrelying on monetary shocks, but the emphasis shifts from nominal
demand changes and lagged price adjustments to informational lags and sup-
ply reactions. Various problems and complications arise, revealed in large part
by intensive testing and criticism. This leads to new attempts to explain the
persistence ofcyclical movements, the role ofuncertainty and financial insta-
bility, real shocks, gradual price adjustments, etc. Conclusions are drawn in
the lastsection, which stresses the need for a realistic synthesis.
2. Two sets of writings should be mentioned in this context, namely, the theories of the new
radical economists and those embodied in some ofthe recent "disequilibrium" models. For sum-
maries or surveys, see Sherman 1976; Malinvaud 1977; and Drazen 1980.
Also, the early mathematical models and the more recent theories of the "political business
cycle".receive little attention in the present paper; monographs surveying this literature are Rau
1974; Gapinski 1982; and Mullineux 1984.22 Chapter 1\vo
2.2 Stylized Facts
2.2.1 The Overall Aspects and Varying Dimensions of Business Cycles
The term "business cycle," is a misnomer insofar as no unique periodicities
are involved, but its wide acceptance reflects the recognition of important
regularities oflong standing. The observed fluctuations vary greatly in ampli-
tude and scope as well as duration, yet they also have much in common. First,
they are national, indeed often international, in scope, showing up in a multi-
tude of processes, not just in total output, employment, and unemployment.
Second, they are persistent-lasting, as a rule several years, that is, long
enough to permit the development ofcumulative movements in the downward
as well as upward direction. This is well established by the historical chronol-
ogies ofbusiness cycles in the United States, Great Britain, France, and Ger-
many, a product of a long series of studies by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (Bums and Mitchell 1946; Moore 1961, 1983; Moore and
Zarnowitz 1986; see also chapter 5). For all their differences, business expan-
sions and contractions consist of patterns ofrecurrent, serially correlated and
cross-correlated movements in many economic (and even other) activities.
Seasonal movements, which are periodic but often variable in size and pat-
tern, may obscure the cyclical developments from an observer of current
changes in individual time series. The same applies to short, erratic move-
ments, which are similarly ubiquitous. But, looking back across monthly or
quarterly data representing many different variables, business cycles can be
clearly distinguished from the other fluctuations in that they are as a rule
larger, longer, and more widely diffused. They dominate changes in the econ-
omy over spans of several years, in contrast to the seasonal and other varia-
tions which spend themselves over spans of a year or less. They reflect, and
interact with, long growth trends which dominate developments across dec-
ades.
Peacetime expansions in the United States averaged about 3 years in the last
half-century, 2 years in the earlier periods containing 10 cycles each (table
2.1). Each of the wartime expansions was much longer. Contractions have
averaged close to 1 year since 1933, almost twice as long in the earlier peri-
ods. This suggests a strong shift toward longer and more variable expansions
and shorter and more uniform contractions since the Great Contraction ofthe
early 1930s. However, the NBER dates for the early business cycles are based
on limited information and may overstate the length ofsome ofthe recessions
(see note to the table). The mean duration of full peacetime cycles has re-
mained approximately stable at 4 years.
The individual phase and cycle durations show considerable variability over
time, as shown by the standard deviations in table 2.1. However, when the
relatively rare outliers are discounted, fairly clear central tendencies emerge.
Thus the ranges of 1.5-3 years, 1-2 years, and 2.5-5 years account for three23 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
Table 2.1 Average Duration ofBusiness Cycles in the United States, 1854-1982
Average Measures ofPhase and Cycle Durations
No. of Full Cycle
Business Expansion Contraction (T to T)
Cycles
Period Covered Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(years, T to T) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1854-97 10 27 9 24 17 51 24
1897-1933 10 23 10 20 10 43 10
1933-82 10 49 27 II 3 60 26
1933-82, excl. wars 7 37 15 11 4 48 14
1854-1982 30 33 20 18 12 51 22
1854-1982, excl. wars 25 27 11 19 13 46 16
Note: All means and standard deviations (S.D.) are rounded to full months. Expansions are measured
from troughs (T) to peaks (P), contractions from P to T, the full cycles from T to T. Figures in line 4
exclude the expansions during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War and the immediately
following contractions. Figures in line 6 exclude also the expansions during the Civil War and World
War I and the immediately followng contractions. For references and underlying detail see Moore and
Zamowitz 1986.
It should be noted that the data available for identifying and measuring the historical business cycles
are fragmentary and often weak. Much of the evidence relates to cyclically sensitive sectors and pro-
cesses. Hence some of the early fluctuations may have involved only slowdowns rather than absolute
declines in total output and employment. If so, the averages in lines 1 and 2 should be somewhat larger
for expansions and smaller for contractions. This would only moderately reduce the contrast with
the entries in line 3 and would not significantly alter the overall conclusions drawn in the text (see chap-
ter 7).
fourths or more of the peacetime expansions, contractions, and full cycles in
the United States, respectively.
The amplitudes ofcyclical expansions vary as much as their durations, with
which they tend to be well correlated. The rates of change (velocities) and
diffusion show less variability across the cycles. Table 2.2 provides some evi-
dence in support ofthese generalizations.
In the 20 years between the two world wars three major depressions oc-
curred, including the uniquely deep one of 1929-33. Since then no general
declines ofcomparable magnitude have occurred, notwithstanding the gravity
ofrecent conditions ofrising and high unemployment in some countries, such
as the United Kingdom. On the whole recessions have become not only much
shorter but also shallower and less diffused. Table 2.3, using a sampling of
measures for the U.S. business contractions of 1920-82, illustrates the con-
trasting dimensions of major depressions versus other declines and the much
smaller but consistent differences between the "severe" and "mild" recessions.
2.2.2 Main Features of Cyclical Behavior
Most industries and sectors ofthe economy participate in the general busi-
ness cycles with substantial regularity (i.e., they exhibit high conformity or24 Chapter lWo
Table 2.2 Selected Characteristics ofSeven Expansions, United States, 1949-82
Largest Smallest Standard
Value Value Mean Deviation
Line Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4)
Real GNP:
1 Duration (months) 106 12 46 30
2 Total increases (%) 49.2 4.4 21.1 14.7
3 Rate ofincrease (% per year) 6.4 3.5 4.7 1.0
Unemployment rate:
4 Total decline (% points) -5.3 -0.6 -2.7 1.5
Nonfarm employment:
5 Percent ofindustries expanding 100 73 89 9
Source: Moore and Zamowitz 1986, table 6.
Note: The entries in col. 1 refer to the expansion of 2/1961-12/1969 (lines 1-3) and 10/1948-7/
1953 (lines 4 and 5). The entries in col. 2 refer to the expansion of 7/1980-7/1981. The entries
in col. 3 and 4 cover all seven expansions. Line 5 shows the maximum percentage of nonagri-
cultural industries with rising employment, based on changes over 6-month spans.
Table 2.3 Average Duration, Depth, and Diffusion ofThirteen Contractions,
United States, 1920-82
Great Two Major Six Severe Four Mild
Depression Depressions Recessions Recessions
Line Statistic (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average duration (months) 43 16 12 10
Percentage decline:
2 Real GNP -32.6 -13.4 -3.3 -1.7
3 Industrial production -53.4 -32.4 -13.1 -7.8
4 Nonfarm employment -31.6 -10.6 -3.8 -1.7
Unemployment rate:
5 Total increase (% points) 21.7 9.6 3.8 2.3
Nonfarm employment:
6 Percent ofindustries contracting 100 97 88 77
Source: Moore and Zamowitz 1986, table 7.
Note: The contraction of 8/1929-3/1933 is referred to as the Great Depression; the contractions
of 1/1920-7/1921 and 5/1937-611938 are the major depressions. The dates of the six severe
recessions are 5/1923-711924, 11/1948-10/1949, 711953-5/1954, 8/1957-4/1958, 11/1973-3/
1975, and 7/1981-11/1982. The dates ofthe four mild recessions are 1011926-11/1927,411960-
2/1961, 12/1969-11/1970; and 111980-7/1980.
coherence), but some do not (e.g., agriculture, which depends heavily on the
weather, and production ofnaturally scarce resources). 3 Durable producer and
consumer goods tend to have high conformity and large amplitudes ofcyclical
movements in production, employment, and inventories. The amplitudes are
3. This section is based primarily on studies of U.S. economic history, but many ofthe quali-
tative features ofcyclical behavior summarized here are found as well in the data for other major
industrialized countries with private enterprise and free markets: Mitchell 1913, 1927; Schumpe-25 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
much smaller for nondurable goods, and still smaller for most ofthe (nonstor-
able) services. Manufacturers' sales move with greater amplitudes than
wholesalers' sales, and the latter with greater amplitudes than retailers' sales.
In many industries, particularly manufacturing of durables, production is, in
large measure, guided by advance orders, which show large fluctuations fol-
lowed, with variable lags, by much smaller fluctuations in outputs and ship-
ments. The resulting changes in backlogs ofunfilled orders and average deliv-
ery lags are themselves procyclical.
Private investment expenditures, although much smaller in the aggregate
than consumer spending, have much larger cycles in percentage terms. Aggre-
gate production typically fluctuates more widely than aggregate sales, which
implies a procyclical behavior ofinventory investment. Business profits show
very high conformity and much greater amplitude ofcyclical movements than
wages and salaries, dividends, net interest, and rental income.
The level ofindustrial prices tends to have wider fluctuations than the levels
of retail prices and wages. Virtually all U.S. business contractions before
World War II were associated with declines in wholesale prices. 4 However,
the last recession to be accompanied by a significant deflation was that of
1948-49. Since then the price level never fell cyclically, but each ofthe seven
U.S. recessions of 1953-82 resulted in a temporary reduction of the rate at
which prices rose, that is, in some disinflation. But, in contrast to the general
price indexes for consumer and producer goods, prices ofindustrial commod-
ities and raw materials traded in organized auction markets continued to show
high sensitivity to business cycles, often turning down early in slowdowns as
well as contractions.
Narrowly and broadly defined monetary aggregates usually experience only
reduced growth rates, not absolute declines, in connection with ordinary
recessions. Only in cycles with severe contractions do substantial downward
movements interrupt the pronounced upward trends in these series. The in-
come velocity of money (i.e., ratio of income to the stock of currency and
commercial bank deposits held by the public) tends to move procyclically (up
in expansions and down in contractions), allowing for its long trends (down-
ward before World War II, then upward for some time).
Short-term interest rates display high positive conformity and generally
large amplitudes of movements relative to their average level in each cycle.
However, when measured in basis points, cyclical changes in these series are
typically small when the interest-rate levels are low. Long-term rates usually
ter 1939; Frickey 1942; Burns and Mitchell 1946; Abramovitz 1950; Mitchell 1951; Gayer, Ros-
tow, and Schwartz 1953; Matthews, 1959; Moore 1961,1983; R. A. Gordon 1961; M. Friedman
and Schwartz 1963a; Hultgren 1965; Zamowitz 1972a, 1973; Zamowitz and Moore 1984; P. Klein
and Moore 1985.
4. This is true both for the periods oflong-term inflationary trends (1843-64, 1896-1920) and
for those oflong-term deflationary trends (1864-96, 1920-32).26 Chapter 1\vo
lag behind the short-term rates and have much lower conformity and much
smaller amplitudes. The relative movements in both short-term market rates
and bond yields increased significantly in the recent past compared with their
historical averages. Near cyclical peaks, short rates tend to come close to or
exceed the long rates; near cyclical troughs, they tend to be much lower.
Along with these conformity and amplitude characteristics, the recurring
features ofbusiness cycles include an array oftiming sequences. Months be-
fore total employment, output, and real income turn down, activities marking
the early stages of investment process begin to decline. These include the
formation of new business enterprises, corporate appropriations for capital
expenditure, contracts for commercial and industrial construction, new orders
of machinery and equipment, and new bond and equity issues. Investment
realizations-construction put in place, deliveries and installations of equip-
ment-keep increasing long after the decline in these investment commit-
ments as work continues on the backlog of orders accumulated during the
busiest stages ofexpansion. Indeed, business expenditures for new plant and
equipment often peak when the overall economic contraction is already well
under way. At business cycle troughs, with lower levels of capacity utiliza-
tion, the delivery lags are generally shorter, but investment commitments still
tend to lead and expenditures coincide or lag.
Long before the downturn in total sales, profits per unit of sales decline.
Total profits (a product ofmargins times sales) also lead, but by shorter inter-
vals. Stock prices move early as well, reflecting expected changes in corporate
earnings. Bond prices tend to tum earlier yet (bond yields are generally lag-
ging).
Labor productivity (output per hour) fluctuates procyclically around a sec-
ularly rising trend, generally with leads. Money wages often rise less than
prices in recoveries and more than prices in late expansion stages. This com-
bines with the marked and persistent productivity changes to induce a pro-
cyclical and lagging movement in labor costs per unit ofoutput.
Net changes in consumer installment credit and in mortgage credit out-
standing have similar procyclical, leading behavior patterns. So has the net
change in bank loans to business, but here the leads tend to be shorter and less
consistent. Compared with the overall credit flows, the rates of growth in
monetary aggregates show, in general, lower cyclical conformities and ampli-
tudes and more random variations. They have historically led at business cycle
turns by highly variable but mostly long intervals. Indeed, these leads are
often so long as to produce strong elements ofinverted behavior in the mone-
tary growth rates: that is, extended declines during expansions and rises dur-
ing short recessions.
Consumers' "sentiment," that is, anticipations concerning their economic
and financial fortunes, also has a predominantly leading pattern. Recent reces-
sions in the United States have been preceded, more often than not, by down-
turns, and recoveries by upturns, in consumer buying plans and actual ex-27 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
penditures on automobiles, housing, and related durable goods. Residential
construction commitments, such as new-building permits and housing starts,
have particularly long leads at peaks and often also at troughs ofthe business
cycle. Here the gestation periods are fairly short so that the expenditures
themselves show sizable leads.
Change in business inventories not only conforms positively to cycles in
general economic activity but is highly sensitive and volatile, often leading,
albeit by variable and, on the average, short intervals. Total manufacturing
and trade inventories, on the other hand, are dominated by long trends and
tend to lag. Inventory investment plays a very important role in short and mild
cycles, whereas fluctuations in fixed investment acquire a greater weight in
the longer and larger cycles.
Table 2.4 provides a conspectus of the timing relationships found to be
typical ofbusiness cycles.
2.2.3 Some International Aspects and Recent Developments
Business cycles have tended to be shorter in the United States than in Eu-
rope (e.g., the 1854-1938 period witnessed 21 U.S. cycles averaging 4 years
and only 16 British cycles averaging 5V3 years). However, before World War
II, more than 60% of the cyclical turning points can be matched for all four
countries covered by the NBER chronologies, and only 10% cannot be
matched at all (Moore and Zarnowitz 1986). After World War II, an era of
great reconstruction in Western Europe and Japan set in, which witnessed,
first, a restoration of sound currencies and free markets, then rapid growth.
For some time cyclical setbacks in these countries assumed the form ofretar-
dations of growth rather than absolute declines. However, these slowdowns
and the intervening speedup phases continued to show a high degree of inter-
national diffusion. Then growth slackened and the "classical" business cycles
(with absolute declines in total output and employment) reappeared every-
where in the 1970s. The tendency for these cycles to be roughly synchronized
across the major trading countries became visible again, even without allow-
ances for discrepancies in the longer growth trends. 5
In a large economy dominated by production for domestic markets, busi-
ness cycles are likely to be induced primarily by internal mechanisms (e.g.,
fluctuations in spending on durable goods endogenously and elastically fi-
nanced) but they are then transmitted abroad through the movements in im-
ports that are a positive function of production and income. For small and,
particularly, less developed countries, fluctuations in exports usually call the
tune. Ofcourse, foreign influences can be critical, at times, for even the larg-
est and relatively least open economy. This is well illustrated by the adverse
effects on the United States of the OPEC oil price boosts in 1973-74 and
5. These events rekindled interest in business cycles oflargerdimensions and essentially endog-
enous nature; see Volcker 1978.28 Chapter Two
Table 2.4 lYpical Leads and Lags among Major Economic Indicators
Leading Roughly Coincident Lagging
I. Investment in Fixed Capital andInventories
New building permits; housing




mfg.*; contracts and orders
for plant and equipment







Business expenditures for new
plant and equipment*
Mfg. and trade inventories
II. Consumption, Trade, Orders, and Deliveries
Production ofconsumer
goods
Mfg. and trade sales
New orders for consumer
goods and materials
Change in unfilled orders, du-
rable goods*









Productivity (output per hour)
Rate ofcapacity utilization
(mfg. mtls.)
III. Employment, Production, and Income
Nonagricultural employment Average duration of
Unemployment rate unemployment
GNP; personal income Long-term unemployment
Industrial production, total





Total corporate profits; net
cash flows
Unit labor costs
Labor share in national income
Monetary growth rates*
Change in liquid assets*
Change in consumer credit*
Total private borrowing*
Real money supply
V. Money, Credit, andInterest
Velocity of money Short-term interest rates*
Bond yields*
Consumer credit outstanding*
Commercial and industrial loans
outstanding
Note: Series marked * are in nominal terms (some have the same average timing properties when de-
flated). All other series are in real terms (constant dollars, physical units) or related indexes and ratio
numbers. The selection is based on U.S. indicators published in Business Conditions Digest, a monthly
report by the Bureau ofEconomic Analysis, U.S. Department ofCommerce. The timing relations among
corresponding series for other countries are in many respects similar (Moore 1983, ch. 6).
Abbreviations: mfg. = manufacturing; mtls. = materials.29 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
1979-80 through increased costs and prices (leftward shifts in the aggregate
supply schedule) and reduced real disposable income (hence, presumably
also, some leftward shifts in the aggregate demand schedule). Such world-
wide supply shocks, although clearly of major importance in the context of
contemporary problems of productivity, growth, and development, are new
and rare phenomena whose role in business cycles generally is modest but in
danger of being overemphasized.6 The more persistent effects come from
changes on the demand side. Thus the volume, prices, and value of U.S. ex-
ports show fluctuations that correspond well to cycles in the dollar value of
imports by the outside world (Mintz 1967). The demand changes are power-
fully reinforced when the links among the major countries convert their inde-
pendent cyclical tendencies into fluctuations that are roughly synchronized.
These links result not only from international trade (current-account trans-
actions in goods and services) but also from international lending and invest-
ment (capital-account transactions in assets). The latter factor became partic-
ularly important in recent times when asset markets became highly integrated
worldwide. Interest rates (adjusted for the anticipated exchange-rate move-
ments) are now linked across the open economies, and capital flows are ex-
tremely sensitive to the risk-adjusted differentials in expected rates ofreturn.
Partly because ofthe increased capital mobility, the shift from fixed to flex-
ible exchange rates in the early 1970s provided much less insulation against
foreign disturbances than was hoped for, and also much less autonomy for
effective national macroeconomic policies. The price levels adjusted for ex-
change rates (i.e., the "real exchange rates") show large and persistent move-
ments over time: the purchasing power parity does not hold over time spans
relevant for the study of business cycles. The recent fluctuations in real eco-
nomic activity show a very considerable degree ofinternational convergence,
which presumably reflects not only the exposure to common disturbances but
also the increased interdependence among (openness of) nations (Whitman
1976; P. A. Klein 1976; Moore 1983, ch. 6).
In the 1960s, when it appeared that business contractions in Europe and
Japan were being replaced by mere retardations, there was a revival ofinterest
in cycles defined in terms ofdeviations from long trends rather than levels of
economic aggregates. Forlack ofa better term, the alternations ofabove-trend
and below-trend growth phases came to be called growth cycles. These short
fluctuations are defined by the consensus ofdetrended indicators just as busi-
ness cycles are defined by the consensus ofthe same time series with no allow-
ance for their long-term trends. The trends are estimated only to be eliminated
from each series separately. Growth cycles in this sense are thus sharply dif-
6. James Hamilton (1983), writes about the role of changes in crude oil prices in the U.S.
recessions after World War II. It should be noted that many recessions are preceded by upward
cost pressures and supply restrictions associated with the boom-and-slowdown sequence ofmiddle
and late expansion stages. On the developments during 1973-76, see Zamowitz and Moore, 1977.30 Chapter Two
ferent from, and should not be confused with, any fluctuations in the long-
term growth rates themselves.
They also need to be clearly distinguished from business cycles. Most per-
sistent and pervasive economic slowdowns begin with much reduced but still
positive growth rates and then develop into actual declines-recessions. Thus
the high-growth phase typically coincides with the business cycle recovery
and middle-expansion, and the low-growth phase with late expansion and
contraction. But some slowdowns stay in the range of positive growth rates
and result in renewed expansion, not recession. Thus growth cycles are more
numerous than business cycles and more symmetrical, being measured from
rising trends.
One can imagine a lengthy period of low, positive growth that would be
associated with as much deterioration in business conditions and rise in un-
employment as a short and moderate recession-and more. But it is also pos-
sible for a slowdown mainly to reduce inflationary excess demand created in
the preceding boom, without causing much surplus capacity and real hard-
ship. The policy implications of such a deceleration in economic growth are
entirely different from those of a recession, which always depresses real in-
comes and spending, outputs, and employment.
In actual experience, those decelerations in growth that have not led to ab-
solute declines in aggregate economic activity (in recent U.S. history: 1951-
52, 1962-64, and 1966-67) occupy an intermediate position between the two
hypothetical cases considered above. Their adverse effects were felt primarily
in areas of particular sensitivity, notably as declines in housing activity and
stock prices. Unemployment would cease falling rather than rise substantially,
and profits would weaken rather than tumble. Thus the overall impact ofeach
of these slowdowns on economic activity was definitely less than even the
mildest ofrecent recessions.
Some economists focus on the nature and sources of expansions and con-
tractions, that is, on the business cycles. Others, by abstracting from the long-
run trend, actually address growth cycle phenomena while aiming at an
analysis of business cycles; that is, they fail to differentiate between the two
categories. The latter treatment, frequently implicit in the theoretical literature
of recent years, may not be a good practice. General business contractions
need to be distinguished from periods of low but positive growth. However,
mild recessions and severe depressions are also quite different. Also, many
important regularities described in the previous section are observed, to a
large extent, in the context of growth cycles as well. Thus, when the series
that tend to lead at business cycle turns are adjusted for their own long trends,
the resulting detrended series are generally found to be leading at growth cycle
turns. An analogous statement can be made for the roughly coincident and
lagging indicators. Systematic differences among the series with respect to
their conformity and amplitude characteristics are likewise largely retained
after the necessary transformations.31 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
2.3 Theories ofSelf-Sustaining Cycles
2.3.1 Disparities and Common Elements in Some Early Theories
The classics of business cycle literature made lasting contributions to the
description and analysis of the motion of industrialized market economies.
They addressed the cumulative processes ofinflationary expansions and defla-
tionary contractions induced by bank credit fluctuations constrained by the
availability of reserves under the gold standard (Hawtrey 1913). The role of
discrepancies between the market and the "natural" interest rates in this pro-
cess was much explored following Knut Wicksell ([1898] 1936). At below-
equilibrium market rates, excessive bank credit creation produces overinvest-
ment in capital-goods industries and imposes "forced saving" on those whose
incomes lag behind inflation (Hayek 1933). But banks will have to curtail the
supply of credit, and individuals will tend to restore their old consumption
standards. As the demand and resources shift back to consumer-goods indus-
tries, undersaving-real capital shortage and losses to the producers ofcapital
goods-results, causing a decline in these industries which cannot be com-
pensated elsewhere in the short run. A deflationary downturn cannot be
avoided. Here the monetary changes are linked to real "vertical maladjust-
ments": that is, imbalances between production of capital and consumer
goods or between aggregates of investment plans and savings decisions (Tu-
gan-Baranovskii [1894] 1913; Spiethoff [1925] 1953).
Other writers worked out the importance of long gestation and life periods
ofcapital goods and developed some cyclical aspects ofthe acceleration prin-
ciple (Aftalion 1913; 1. M. Clark 1917,1934). Schumpeter (1939) saw eco-
nomic growth itself as a cyclical process, reflecting technological progress
and spurts of innovations-opening up and temporary exhaustion of oppor-
tunities for new, profitable investment. Related factors include the failure of
foresight, intersectoral shifts, and changes in relative prices. Thus, under un-
certainty, interdependent expectations ofbusiness people generate widespread
errors ofoptimism in expansions and pessimism in contractions (Pigou 1927).
Unpredictable shifts in demand or supply lead to "horizontal maladjust-
ments"-say, overinvestment in a particular sector, which involves indivisible
and durable fixed capital, high costs of adjustments, and temporary but cu-
mulative depressant effects (Robertson [1915] 1948). Unit costs of labor and
production tend to rise relative to output prices before and after the downturn,
and they tend to fall before and after the upturn, reflecting changes in capacity
utilization and productivity; as a result, business profits show large fluctua-
tions, which help explain the cyclical movements in investment and output
(Mitchell 1913, 1927).
This capsule summary can merely illustrate the broad range of views held
by these early students of business cycles. It is clear that there are important
disagreements among their theories, particularly with respect to the relative32 Chapter Two
importance of monetary and real factors, long a major point of contention.
But the dominant tone is one ofawareness that what matters most is the inter-
action of changes in money and credit with changes in economic activity,
particularly those connected with business investment. Most of the writers
considered business cycles to be caused and conditioned by a number of fac-
tors and circumstances, and so their theories typically overlap and vary mainly
in the emphasis accorded the different elements (Haberler [1937] 1964).
Not surprisingly, there is much in these individual theories that is unsatis-
factory, unduly restrictive, or out-of-date. Here we must abstract from the
detail and note that it is the high degree ofconsensus and achievement that is
much more remarkable from the present point ofview.
The first aspect ofessential agreement is that the theories are mainly endog-
enous. That is, they purposely concentrate on internal dynamics ofthe system
(interrelations and lagged reactions among its components). The authors gen-
erally held that contemporary industrial economies are, as a result of such
dynamics, subject to recurrent fluctuations with major regularities that can be
explained economically. They believed that "the cyclical movement has a
strong tendency to persist, even where there are no outstanding extraneous
influences at work which can plausibly be held responsible." Hence they
viewed the role of the exogenous forces as secondary, even though acknowl-
edging that the latter continually act "as the originators or disturbers ofendog-
enous processes, with power to accelerate, retard, interrupt, or reverse the
endogenous movement ofthe economic system." 7
Second, these economists all basically adhered to the standard economic
theory of their times, which is what Keynes later labeled the "classical
school"; indeed, the latter is well personified by some of them. At the same
time, they generally appreciated the seriousness of the problem of economic
instability. The business cycles oftheir principal concern were major fluctua-
tions measured in years of cumulative expansions and contractions. The re-
current phases of widespread unemployment and underutilization of produc-
tive capacities did (and still do) present a deep puzzle to the classical doctrine,
according to which the economy is always in, or at least tending closely to,
the general equilibrium. Thus, for a long time, business cycles were simply
ignored by most economic theorists or, at best, were viewed as merely tem-
porary "frictional" interference with, and departure from, equilibrium. But
students of the subject, including those who were themselves committed to
the equilibrium theory, have done much to counteract this evasive and unten-
able position.
7. Both quotations are from Haberler (1937) 1964, p. 10. This characterization is strongly
confirmed by numerous passages in works by Robertson (1915, in particular pt. II, ch. 4); Mitch-
ell (1927, esp. chs. I and 5), Hayek (1933, esp. ch. 4), and Pigoll (1927, chs. 6-8,21). For
Schumpeter, the basic mechanism ofcredit-financed innovations is ofmuch greater intrinsic inter-
est than the multitude ofdiverse "external factors," no matter how important the latter may be on
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Third, in the historical periods addressed by these studies the level ofprices
tended to move up during the general business expansions and down during
contractions. The positive correlation between cyclical movements in broad
price indexes and real activity measures implied that fluctuations in total nom-
inal expenditures parallel the fluctuations in the aggregates of real income,
employment, and output. This was generally accepted as a central character-
istic of business cycles by the early theories, in which the fluctuations in ag-
gregate money flows of income and spending play a large, proximately
"causal" role. Ofcourse, for these fluctuations to produce cyclical movements
in real variables, it is necessary that wages and prices adjust with some suffi-
cient lags rather than being highly flexible. Sometimes this condition was as-
sumed explicitly but it was not much discussed and often only implied (Ha-
berler [1937] 1964, pp. 459-61).8
2.3.2 Uncertain Expectations, Unstable Investment,
and Long Depression Cycles
Keynes (1936, ch. 22, esp. pp. 314-15) attributed to the trade cycle a sud-
den, sharp downturn, a protracted decline, and a gradual, sluggish upturn.
These are all characteristics ofthe 1929 peaks and the depressions and recov-
eries of the 1930s in Great Britain and the United States; also, in part, ofthe
British experience in the depressed early 1920s. They are not typical ofmost
cycles in these countries and elsewhere.
The sharp downturn, or "crisis," is explained mainly by "a sudden collapse
in the marginal efficiency ofcapital." During a boom, the supply ofnew capi-
tal goods and the cost of their production and financing rise, with growing
adverse effects on the current returns on investment. The inducement to invest
is further weakened ifthe current costs come to be viewed as higher than the
probable future costs. Optimism about the always uncertain future returns lin-
gers for some time, but sooner or later doubts arise about the reliability ofthe
hopeful expectations engendered by the boom.
Investment expectations are highly volatile because even those forecasts of
long-term profitability ofspecific business projects which are viewed as most
probable inspire little confidence. Observable frequencies of past outcomes
are not generally a source ofpredictive knowledge in these matters. Keynes's
world is thus one ofpervasive uncertainty which is sharply distinguished from
calculable and insurable risk (as in Knight 1921).
It is easier and more rewarding to predict the short-term movements in the
stock market, which are strongly affected by "mass psychology," than to di-
vine the long-term prospects for individual business concerns. The market
reacts promptly to news offluctuating business profits with revaluations which
8. In terms of the present-day conventional macroeconomic model, let us add, the positive
correlation of fluctuations in prices and real variables would indicate that shifts in aggregate de-
mand dominate the shifts in aggregate supply over the business cycle. Ifthis sounds rather alien
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inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate ofcurrent investment. A new
business will not attract investors if a similar existing one can be acquired on
the exchange at lower costs (Keynes 1936, p. 151).
This last insight gave rise to an influential theory of James Tobin (1969),
which makes investment in new plant and equipment an increasing function
ofq, the ratio ofthe value placed by the security markets on the existing firm
to the replacement cost ofits capital. This approach has several advantages: it
is relatively simple, uses observable variables, and provides an analytically
attractive linkage between investment and the expectations of the financial
asset markets. Implicitly, it also relates the expected profit rate to the required
rate of return on capital in the stock market and, hence, to the interest rate.
However, the hypothesis has not fared well in empirical tests (Von Fursten-
berg 1977; P. K. Clark 1979; Blanchard and Wyplosz 1981; Abel and Blan-
chard 1983; R. J. Gordon and Veitch 1984). This is perhaps partly because of
the use of average q instead ofthe theoretically more appropriate marginal q9
but more likely because of various simplifying restrictions used in this work:
homogeneous capital and perfect financial markets with no liquidity con-
straints on firms. These idealizations are poorly suited for an analysis of cy-
clical movements in investment and they certainly clash with the Keynesian
views on the instability offinancial markets (sect. 2.4.6).10
Once aroused, the doubts about profitability ofplanned and current invest-
ment projects spread rapidly, bringing down in "disillusion" the stock market,
which is revealed to have been overoptimistic and overbought. As the pendu-
lum swings to overpessimism, the demand for broadly defined money will
increase, raising the rate ofinterest and hence seriously aggravating the crisis.
The revival of investment will require a "return of confidence . . . an aspect
ofthe slump which bankers and businessmen have been right in emphasizing"
(Keynes 1936, p. 317). But confidence, once severely shaken, takes time to
mend. Also, the propensity to consume is adversely affected by the fall in the
value ofequities.
Only as the downswing develops will it bring the level of interest rates
down. This decline will not be as prompt and large as would be necessary to
counter the "collapse" of investment. The demand for money is interest elas-
tic, highly so at low levels of the rates, because of bearish speculation in the
face of basic uncertainty as to future changes in the rate of interest. The con-
9. This is the ratio of the increase in the value of the firm from acquiring an additional unit of
capital to the marginal cost ofthat unit (which, in contrast to the measured average q, is an ex ante
and not directly observable quantity).
10. The same observations apply a fortiori to the "neoclassical" investment theory dating from
Jorgenson 1963, which concentrates on the average long-term behavior as determined by the
requirement that the expected returns over the life of a project exceed its costs. The short-run
deterrent effect on investment ofthe rising flow supply price ofcapital goods (stressed in Keynes
1936, ch. 11) is not well captured in this approach, and the expectationallags are not distinguish-
able from the gestation periods or delivery lags (Abel 1980). For recent tests of this and other
investment theories, see also Bischoff 1971; and Kopcke 1977.35 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
clusion here is that a recovery from a severe slump is possible only after the
capital stock ofbusiness has been reduced sufficiently to restore its profitabil-
ity. This may take several years, through use, wear and tear, or obsolescence
(Keynes 1936, p. 151).
It might appear that overbuilding is the cause of the downturn and long
slump but Keynes insists that it is not. Rather, the effective private demand
fails to sustain full employment because investment is too unstable and the
propensity to consume is stable but too low. It is only relative to the deficient
demand that "overinvestment" can occur; there is no saturation of profitable
investment opportunities at full employment.
Keynes's concern was with long and severe depressions characterized by
very large declines to low levels of both real investment and stock market
values. Such major depressions have occurred at intervals of a few decades
through the 1930s but most business contractions were much milder and
shorter. Even in long contractions the stock of capital usually continues to
increase, although at much reduced rates; also, an abrupt collapse of invest-
ment is rare. 11 Consumer spending is much less stable in the short run than
Keynes assumed (but also much more stable and supportive of growth in the
long run). As for the demand for money, there is a mass of evidence that its
interest-elasticity tends to be relatively low (Laidler 1969). These observa-
tions raise serious questions about some elements ofKeynes's theory.
2.3.3 Wage and Price Dynamics in Business Cycles
Despite the great rise and persistence of unemployment, real wages in-
creased throughout the 1930s, thereby failing to provide one classical cure for
the apparent disequilibrium in the labor market. 12 Keynes (1936, chs. 19 and
21) did not argue that money wages are entirely rigid downward but rather
that they adjust but sluggishly to excess supplies of labor. Such slow wage
declines are apt to reduce incomes, consumption, and prices before they begin
to improve profitability and stimulate investment. When the resulting gradual
deflation becomes widely anticipated, people repeatedly postpone purchases,
mainly ofdurable goods, while waiting for prices to fall further. The demand
for money increases at the exp~nse ofthe demand for goods and equities.
Moreover, unexpected deflation increases the burden of accu~ulateddebt,
which falls most heavily on businesses and individuals with high propensities
to borrow, invest, and spend. The activities of these units are severely cur-
tailed as their bank credit lines are cut. Business failures and personal bank-
ruptcies rise in numbers and size. Irving Fisher (1932, 1933) ascribed the
11. These points were made early by Bums (in his collected essays, 1954, pp. 3-25, 207-35).
On the dispersion of peaks in various categories of investment commitments and expenditures,
see Zamowitz 1973, ch. 4.
12. In the United States, average hourly earnings in manufacturing divided either by the con-
sumer price index or by the wholesale price index rose approximately 20% between 1929 and
1934, for example. Money wage rates declined less than prices. Hours ofwork fell along with the
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depth ofthe Depression to the confluence and mutual reinforcement ofdefla-
tion and "overindebtedness" inherited from the boom. (This suggests overin-
vestment as the cause ofthe downturn.) His policy prescription was monetary
reflation, a reversal ofthe price decline.
A one-time large drop in the general wage level is a theoretical but hardly a
practical alternative in a large decentralized economy with numerous,
strongly differentiated labor markets and a complicated structure of relative
wages. A spreading depression in an open system is more likely to result in
competitive devaluations and various protectionist "beggar my neighbor"
measures, with deeply damaging overall consequences.
The actual and expected changes in the rates ofchange in wages and prices
can certainly be of great importance in business cycle dynamics. The effects
on aggregate demand ofchanges in the levels ofwages and prices, on the other
hand, are believed to have their main roles in comparative statics and the long
run. 13 The static and dynamic elements were never clearly distinguished by
Keynes and his immediate critics; the debate proceeded for a long time in the
framework of comparative statics, which obscured the essentially dynamic
disequilibrium nature ofKeynes's theory (Leijonhufvud 1968).
After World War II inflation became, for the first time, a chronic condition
in peacetime, drawing attention away from the concurrent, relatively mild
recessions and at the same time making their understanding apparently much
more difficult. The old problem of depression-cum-deflation was replaced by
the new problem of unemployment-cum-inflation. The famous Phillips curve
emerged first as a nonlinear and inverse dependence of the rate of change in
nominal wages (w) on the rate ofunemployment (U) and was rationalized by
relating U to the excess supply of labor (Phillips 1958; Lipsey 1960). Soon
the rate ofinflation (p) was similarly related to U, on the ground that p and w
normally differ by a steady rate of growth in labor productivity (Samuelson
and Solow 1960). 14
The classical view ofan aggregated labor market posits the existence at any
time ofa unique equilibrium, or "natural," unemployment rate (UN) as a func-
tion of real wages (M. Friedman 1968). An inflation that has lasted for some
significant time will be expected to persist at some positive average rate (pe).
Changes in the price level that are generally and correctly anticipated are
13. The reference here is, first, to the "Keynes effect" (at lower prices, a given quantity of
money represents a larger real quantity) and the "Pigou effect" (at lower prices, a given quantity
ofnet nominal private wealth represents a largerreal quantity). The former would raise investment
through lower interest rates; the latter would raise consumption. To stimulate the economy in the
short run both require downward flexibility of prices generally. The Keynes effect depends in-
versely on the interest-elasticity ofthe demand for money. The Pigou effect depends positively on
the magnitude of net private wealth, which is probably small in relative terms. Deflationaryex-
pectations and distributional shifts may also greatly weaken this process (Pigou 1947; Patinkin
1948).
14. It should be noted that from the cyclical perspective it is far from innocuous to substitute
price for wage inflation. As will be shown in section 2.3.6, labor productivity and the related price
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matched by wage changes and hence cannot cause deviations of U from UN.
Only unanticipated inflation, that is, forecast errors (pe - p), can cause such
deviations. Equilibrium requires that pe = p, hence a stable long-run tradeoff
between p and U cannot exist (the natural-rate hypothesis-NRH: Friedman
1966, 1968; Phelps 1967). A short-run Phillips curve, associated with unan-
ticipated or disequilibrium inflation, stays in place only as long as pe remains
unchanged. 15
The initial reaction ofmost economists to the Friedman-Phelps critique was
to embrace the NRH without questioning the existence ofan inverse relation-
ship between inflation and unemployment in the short run. This was because
they assumed expectations to be "adaptive," that is, backward looking and
involving only partial and lagging corrections of past errors. 16 Indeed, it was
frequently assumed that the errors of inflation forecasts are fully eliminated
only on the average over the business cycle. On this permissive interpretation
of a "long run," the NRH is entirely consistent with continuing parallel fluc-
tuations in inflation and real economic activity around their (uncorrelated)
long-trend movements.
The expectations-augmented but only slowly shifting Phillips curve appears
in Tobin's 1975 analysis of Keynesian models of cyclical contractions, with
the qualification that this does not imply a full acceptance ofthe NRH. In this
dynamic model, output (Q) moves in reaction to changes in aggregate real
demand (E). In the short run the two variables can differ: say, E< Q when Q
is rising because oflags in consumption and unintended inventory changes. E
depends positively on Q and the expected price change pe and negatively on
the price level P. Actual inflation p (= rate ofchange in P) adjusts to changes
in pe and in Q relative to QN (the full-employment output). Finally pe reacts to
the divergencies ofp from pe. The equilibrium conditions are E =Q, Q = QN,
and p = pe. The main inference from the model is that "a strong negative
price-level effect on aggregate demand, a weak price-expectations effect, and
a slow response ofprice expectations to experience are conducive to stability"
(Tobin 1975, pp. 199-200). Large adverse shocks to E can push the economy
into a depression, and market price adjustments will provide no reasonably
prompt and effective remedy under conditions where the price-change effects
onE are stronger than the price-level effects. 17
2.3.4 Disequilibrium Models with Capital Accumulation
Keynes's analysis is only implicitly and partially dynamic. Since net in-
vestment varies, so does total capital, which influences output, investment,
15. The general form for the original equation is w, = I(U,); for the "expectations-augmented"
equation satisfying the NRH it is w, = I(U,) + p~.
16. A simple model ofthis type ifP~ - P~_I = k(p,_J - P~_I)' where O<k< 1.
The early locus classicus for adaptive expectations is Cagan 1956; also Muth 1960; Nerlove
and Wage 1964; and Mincer 1969a.
17. Tobin, 1980, ch. 1, has a more recent reassessment, with similar conclusions concerning
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and savings. But these effects are ignored and the stocks ofproduction factors
and technology are treated as constant. The older acceleration principle has
no role in the General Theory, and indeed is not even mentioned. But the
1930s and 1940s saw a proliferation of formal models of essentially endoge-
nous cycles in aggregate output, which use various versions ofthe investment
accelerator and the consumption multiplier and let the two interact (Harrod
1936; Kalecki 1937; Samuelson 1939; Metzler 1941; Hicks 1950).
In most of these formulations, net investment is a function of changes in
output, which implies that fluctuations in consumption are transmitted with
increasing amplitudes to the higher stages ofproduction-thederived demand
for intermediate and producer goods. This contrast in amplitudes is broadly
consistent with the evidence (sec. 2.2.2), which has long made the accelera-
tion principle attractive to business cycle theorists. Yet it is clear from the data
that investment series have much higher persistence or serial correlations than
the series of first differences in output or sales. The simultaneous relationship
between these variables over short unit periods is weak, not surprisingly, since
investment depends on expectational and financial factors as well as on
changes in technology, cost oflabor, etc. 18
With consumption lagging behind income and induced investment behind
change in output, the multiplier-accelerator interaction can produce a model
offluctuating output in the form ofa second-order difference equation. Small
values of the coefficient of acceleration result in damped cycles, large values
in explosive cycles. When a trend is added reflecting continuous technological
change embodied in "autonomous" investment, the cycles are slanted upward
around a line whose slope represents the equilibrium rate of the economy's
real growth. In the potentially explosive case, fluctuations in actual output are
constrained between a "ceiling" along which the (growing) resources are fully
utilized and a "floor" set by the non-negativeness of gross investment (Hicks
1950). This model uses distributed lags in consumption and investment func-
tions and suspends the accelerator during a steep downswing, with the result
that the slump is both cushioned and prolonged as the excess stocks ofcapital
depreciate but slowly down to the levels required by the low production at the
floor.
A closely related but more general class of models is based on the capital
stock adjustment (or "flexible accelerator") principle: current investment
equals some fraction of the gap between the desired and the actual capital.
The desired stock varies directly with output (taken, questionably, as a proxy
for the expected demand for output that the capital is to help produce). Net
18. The theory of the production function of the firm includes the acceleration effect but also,
in the general case of variable factor proportions and prices, a substitution effect (e.g., Gapinski
1982, chs. 2 and 4). Net investment cannot decline in any period by more than the capital stock
can be worn out, which suggests asymmetrical behavior between upswings and downswings. In
principle, it is in the long run, along the rising trend ofcapacity output, that the simple accelerator
making net investment proportional to the change in output should work best, not in the short run
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investment therefore depends positively on output and inversely on the ini-
tially available stock ofcapital. This formulation (used early in Kalecki 1935;
Kaldor 1940; Goodwin 1951) is capable ofbeing improved, with some signif-
icant advantages. Since profitability should depend positively on the output-
capital ratio, the role of profits in the investment function (stressed by many
authors, particularly after Tinbergen 1938-39) is given at least an indirect
consideration. The fraction of the capital gap closed in the short unit period
(the speed of adjustment) may be made a function of the interest rate and,
more generally, the costs of capital. The costlier the speed, the more gradual
will be the optimal adjustment; this opens the way to a potentially useful dy-
namic analysis. On the other hand, the cyclical changes in capital stock, being
relatively small (and rarely negative), have probably rather weak short-term
effects on investment and output.
The dynamics in the models under review come from lags, nonlinearities,
or both. Nonlinearities are likely to be very common in economic relation-
ships, in part because the numerical values of certain important parameters
should vary with the phases ofbusiness cycles, which cover a wide variety of
macroeconomic conditions. Yet, few theoretical models of the cycle make
important use of nonlinearities. In Kaldor 1940, investment (I) is a sigmoid
function ofoutput (Q), with much lower positive slopes at both extremes than
in the broad middle range ofthe Qscale. I is deterred by both surplus capacity
in slumps and rising construction and financial costs in booms. Saving (S) has
a converse shape, with higher positive slopes at both extremes than in the
middle range of Q: people stabilize consumption over time by temporarily
reducing (raising) the average rate of savings when their incomes are un-
usually low (high). 19 Given Q, I depends inversely and S depends positively
on the capital stock K. There are three possible equilibria; two of which are
stable. The result is a self-sustained cycle in the real aggregates, from stable
to unstable to another stable equilibrium. 20
The substantive uses of nonlinearities in the theory of business cycles are
yet to be systematically explored. There are, to be sure, various nonlinearities
in mathematical and econometric models but they are, on the whole, scattered
and treated mainly as technical detail. The early models by Kaldor, Hicks,
and Goodwin remain influential in this literature. 21
19. The argument seems to anticipate the more recent theories ofconsumption ifone adds the
assumption that people perceive larger proportions of their incomes as being transitory in booms
and slumps than in the more "normal" times closer to the trend. Transitory income is taken to be
largely saved; permanent income consumed.
20. The path ofoutput is dQldt=a[l(Q,K) - S(Q,K)], with a>O denoting the speed ofadjust-
ment. The equilibria are defined by /(.) = S(·); they are stable when 8S/8Q>8/18Q, which occurs
at both low and high levels ofQ, and unstable when 8S/8Q<8/18Q, which occurs in an interme-
diate position. The responses ofQ, that is, movements along the / orS curves, are speedier than
the shifts ofthese curves caused by the changes in K.
21. A list ofsome references must suffice: Ichimura 1954; Rose 1967; Bober 1968; Chang and
Smyth 1971; Kosobud and O'Neil 1972; Torre 1977; Scarle 1977, ch. 4; Gapinski 1982, chs. 4-
6, Schinasi 1981, 1982.40 Chapter Two
Recently, some methods of the "singularity" and "catastrophe" theories,
new branches of applied mathematics, began to be applied to the analysis of
large economic fluctuations involving crises, depressions, and rapid recover-
ies. The theory is concerned with the interaction of "fast" and "slow" vari-
ables in dynamic systems described by differential equations, where the short-
run equilibrium may jump from one region of the state space to another. For
example, the rate of change in output may depend on the level of output, a
"fast" variable, and physical capital and financial assets, "slow" variables (ex-
pectations or other parameters may also be treated as slow variables). An il-
lustration using a modified Kaldor model is offered by Varian (1979). This is
an interesting approach, though still in its infancy.
Although innovative in their dynamics, the models discussed here are se-
verely limited in their contents. They slight or ignore the monetary, financial,
and expectational factors which, theory and evidence suggest, are particularly
important in major cycles, crises, and depressions. Most ofthese models, too,
neglect the role of new technology as a determinant of investment (Goodwin
1951 is a notable exception). These criticisms were made early in the heyday
of the endogenous investment theories of the cycle (Bums 1952a; Haberler
1956; Lundberg 1958). A. Hansen (1964) viewed the accelerator as relatively
weak and stressed the driving force of autonomous investment related to in-
novations which require more capital per worker.
However, it is also clear that the models in question contain important ele-
ments and are capable of being expanded and improved, in particular by in-
corporating monetary factors. Indeed, Hicks (1950, chs. 11 and 12), added to
his main real model a monetary subsystem which could aggravate some down-
turns. 22 Tobin's 1955 model has similar cycles but also explicit roles for the
supply of monetary assets and the inflexibility of money wages. More re-
cently, Laidler (1973b) makes the desired capital stock depend on the lagged
real interest rate as well as the lagged output, thereby modifying Hicks's equa-
tion for induced investment so that it includes monetary effects. Inflation ex-
pectations, formed adaptively, appear in a Phillips-type relationship which
complies with the NRH but permits gradual price adjustments. This model
retains an accelerator-multiplier mechanism and can generate fluctuations
in output and prices. However, unlike in Hicks, the cycles are here damped,
and exogenous changes in either the nominal interest rate or autonomous ex-
penditures may be required to move the economy off either the floor or the
ceiling. 23
22. The Hmonetary complication" takes the form of a cobweb cycle in the IS-LM space, with
rather complex lags and nonlinearities. A quarter-century later, Hicks (1974) revised his views,
stressing the need for greater reliance on monetary factors and autonomous investment.
23. Laidler considers, alternatively, the nominal rate ofinterest and the money stock as exoge-
nous. Output is systematically related not to inflation or deflation but to the rate of change in
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2.3.5 On Causes and Consequences of Fluctuations in
Inventory Investment
Inventories have a much shorter expected life span than fixed capital and
can be adjusted much more quickly to the desired levels. Nevertheless, the
success of attempts at such adjustment is by no means assured as it depends
partly on accurate sales forecasts and partly on how promptly production
reacts to unanticipated sales changes. Some ofthe observed inventory invest-
ment is planned, and some is unintended.
It is difficult to use stocks as a buffer protecting output from the variation in
sales, except when the changes in demand are small and short, calling for no
alteration in production. In the more persistent business cycle movements,
inventory investment tends to be, on the contrary, destabilizing, as shown by
the already noted fact that aggregate output fluctuates more widely than final
sales.
An early and influential theory of inventory cycles was developed in Met-
zler's (1941, 1947) multiplier-accelerator models. Here the desired level of
stocks of consumer goods varies with anticipated sales to consumers, which
reflect sales observed in the recent past. Output lags behind consumption,
which is proportional to contemporaneous income. An initial rise in the level
ofnoninventory investment, which is treated as autonomous, depletes inven-
tories; hence business people attempt to increase them. But inventory invest-
ment has the feedback effect of raising income and consumption, which re-
duces the stocks still more. This causes further rounds ofincrease in inventory
investment, output, and sales. However, at some point during the expansion,
the rates ofincrease in sales, and hence also in inventory investment, will start
falling. Declines in income and consumption will ultimately result, reducing
the desired stock levels. Again, the very efforts to get rid of the unwanted
stocks depress income and consumption further and are thus temporarily self-
defeating, but eventually the rate of decline in sales and the disinvestment in
stocks will begin to diminish, and an upturn in income and consumption will
initiate a new cycle.
Several papers report generally favorable tests ofMetzler's model based on
annual and quarterly data, mainly for the United States in the first two decades
after World War II (Coppock 1959, 1962, 1965; Hillinger 1966, 1979). The
periodicities are heavily concentrated in the 3-4 year range and are not seri-
ously disturbed by inclusion of random error terms, but there is substantial
damping. Anticipated values are derived from distributed lags (adaptive ex-
pectations). The techniques include cyclical (NBER) measures, regression,
and spectral analyses. The hypothesis that fluctuations in nonfarm business
inventory investment and nonresidential fixed investment are essentially peri-
odic, with cycles ofabout 3-5 and 7-10 years, respectively, has been recently
revived by Hillinger (1982, 1983). However, the unconventional methods42 Chapter 1\vo
used in this work are subject to serious doubts and the results are yet to be
fully described and evaluated. 24
Metzler's hypothesis, like other cyclical investment models of the
multiplier-accelerator type, runs entirely in real terms and pays no attention
to price adjustments and monetary and financial factors. Also, it fits best the
finished-goods inventories subject to changes reflecting errors in sales fore-
casts. But studies which disaggregate inventories by stage of fabrication and
type of production (Abramovitz 1950; Stanback 1962; Lovell 1964; Mack
1967; Zamowitz 1973; Popkin 1984) show that for good reasons the behavior
ofstocks varies systematically between these categories. Thus finished-goods
inventories are important primarily in production to stock; in production to
order, which plays a very large role in durable-goods and particularly capital-
goods industries, inventories consist mainly of goods-in-process, which
depend positively on the rate of output, and materials, which are strongly
influenced by cyclical changes in supply conditions (delivery periods, availa-
bility). The stocks ofmaterials can be promptly adjusted in the ordering stage.
Of course, it is difficult to allow for such details in aggregate models but an
important lesson here is that desired inventories depend importantly on other
variables in addition to sales.
2.3.6 The Role ofChanges in Prices, Costs, and Profits
In his 1913 volume, Mitchell linked the major changes in business activity
to the outlook for profits or (in time ofcrisis) the quest for solvency. Prospec-
tive profits depend on sales experience and expectations and on the price-cost
relation, which is itself changing with the rate of employment and capacity
utilization. Business costs tend to rise faster than product prices in the late
stages of expansion, which depresses profit margins and expectations. Ac-
cordingly, new investment commitments are curtailed well before sales flat-
ten. Income receipts and consumption expenditures weaken, inventories pile
up, and production cuts multiply, particularly in durable-goods industries.
Pessimistic expectations spread and are confirmed and worsened when output
and employment tum down. In the contraction that follows, similarly, price-
cost margins and profits first deteriorate and then improve, excess stocks and
other imbalances are gradually liquidated, and new investment orders, sales,
and output eventually revive.
When Mitchell first proposed a theoretical account of these developments,
he had little empirical knowledge of them from the very inadequate data then
in existence. By now, however, there is much evidence that the relations he
stressed are generally consistent with the stylized facts discussed in section 2
above. (On their validity, see Fabricant 1959; Hultgren 1950, 1965; Kuh
24. Cycles are estimated by cosine functions applied to residuals from polynomial trends. The
latter lack a theoretical rationale and are limited to the period ofestimation. The paucity ofannual
observations presents another grave problem ofstatistical nature.43 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
1960; Moore 1962, 1975a; Zarnowitz, 1973; Moore and Cullity 1983; Boehm
1990.) What is particularly well established and important is the typically
procyclical but lagging pattern in labor costs per unit ofoutput, which reflects
primarily the positive conformity and lead times of labor productivity (output
per hour ofwork). Real wages, on the other hand, normally do not show large
deviations from trend that are consistently associated with business cycles. 25
In a 1967 model ofRose, employment and labor supply fluctuate relative to
the stock ofcapital, which grows with net investment. The rates ofchange in
wages (w) and prices (p) are equal in the long-run equilibrium but differ in the
short run, reflecting these fluctuations. During a recession, the ratio of labor
supply to capital increases, the rate of employment falls, and prices start ris-
ing faster than wages. The improvement in profitability leads to an upturn in
the rate ofemployment. During the recovery, the conditionp>w, persists, but
gradually investment revives and growth ofcapital accelerates. First employ-
ment and then capital start growing faster than the labor supply. The upswing
eventually causes wages to overtake prices. In the new phase, where p < w,
the profit rate and the employment-capital ratio turn down. Investment is re-
duced, the rate ofemployment declines, and a new recession begins.
The model has debatable implications for the real-wage movements and its
shortcomings are apparent, given the lessons of the recent inflationary era. 26
But all formal models are heavily restricted and the aspect covered here,
namely, the cyclical role ofchanges in the relative input/output prices, is im-
portant enough to make the attempt interesting. Earlier theories of this type,
although not worked out mathematically, are in some respects broader and
more satisfactory. 27
The price-cost-profit nexus can and should be combined with monetary ele-
ments, since, as stressed by Mitchell, business cycles arise only in a "money
economy" in its late stage of development and are incompatible with pure
barter. (For one interesting attempt in this direction, see Rose 1969.) In mod-
25. Countercyclical movements in real wages are implied by the classical marginal productivity
theory of the demand for labor, which was accepted by Keynes, and they are also suggested by
the view that prices generally are more flexible and procyclical than money wages. However, the
evidence is mixed and not conclusive. It varies with the choice ofthe deflator, the characteristics
of the period covered, methods and data (e.g., the intracycle changes may not show up well in
regressions with annual series). A few studies favor the countercyclical hypothesis (Neft~i 1978;
Sargent 1978), but there is more support for both procyclical behavior (Dunlop 1938; Tarshis
1939; Modigliani 1977; Stockman 1983; Bils 1985) and no significant relationship between real
wages and employment (Kuh 1960; Bodkin 1969; Geary and Kennan 1982).
26. Under perfect competition, Rose's hypothesis has real wages increasing in the boom and
early contraction, decreasing in late contraction and recovery. Under impe~fect competition, how-
ever, real wages could be either invariant or procyclical, depending on the elasticities ofdemand
and marginal costs. A single nonlinear Phillips wage-employment curve is involved; shifts in it
would have to be introduced, lest the model be applicable at best to a short period before any
endogenous expectations ofinflation changes develop and take effect.
27. Krelle (1981) demonstrates the similarity ofRose's theory to that ofErich Preiser (1933).
The main difference is that Preiser had a two-sector (consumer-goods, producer-goods) model,
whereas Rose has a simpler, one-sector model.44 Chapter 1\vo
erate cycles, the effective limit on the volume of transactions is set by de-
mand, whereas in "intense booms" a higher limit of monetary nature is
reached. 28
2.4 Theories ofCyclical Response to Monetary and Real Disturbances
2.4.1 Exogenous Factors, Stochastic Elements, and Types ofTheory
Section 2.3 discussed mainly the work of economists who attribute busi-
ness cycles to the modus operandi of industrialized private-enterprise econo-
mies. Here the cycle itself is the principal source of the stresses and imbal-
ances that keep it going. A nonlinear model that requires only a single initial
disturbance to produce self-sustaining cycles has maximum endogeneity. 29
In reality, of course, the economy is always influenced by outside factors
(e.g., weather) so that a comprehensive explanation of its motion cannot be
purely endogenous. But no outside influences can by themselves produce the
recurrent sequences of expansions and contractions; in the first place, this
presumably requires the particular dynamics of an interdependent economic
system. A really satisfactory theory, therefore, should explain how business
cycles are generated by the internal mechanism ofan economy exposed to the
impact of a great many potentially relevant external events. What matters,
then, is the relative role of the inside and outside factors, not the extreme
cases. Nevertheless, a mainly endogenous model ofbusiness cycles differs in
principle sharply from a mainly exogenous one.
The specific events and variables that are usually treated as exogenous in-
clude wars and changes in population, technology, weather, government
spending, tax laws, etc. They clearly can and often do have major economic
consequences that affect cyclical behavior. In addition to these factors, which
usually show considerable persistence over time (are serially correlated),
there are also the random shocks-uncorrelated disturbances ofvarious kinds
which impinge upon the structure ofeconomic relationships. Both the white-
noise and the identifiable exogenous factors play important roles in the linear
and dynamically stable model of Frisch (1933). Here a low value for the ac-
celerator is assumed but also a sufficiently close succession oferratic impulses
which keep the system fluctuating. That is, the response of the economy to
28. For example, an expansion can be halted by the constraint on a further rise in bank credit
imposed by the gold standard, as in Hawtrey (Mitchell 1927, ch. 2). On Mitchell's efforts to
synthesize real, monetary, and expectational factors in viewing both the causes and effects of
business cycles, see M. Friedman 1952; Zamowitz 1968a, and ch. 5 this volume.
29. Fluctuations that are neither damped nor explosive but self-sustaining are simply not cred-
ible in linear models. It would be extremely unlikely, for example, for the accelerator always to
assume that precise middle value which is needed to keep the system in a constant cycle. With
random shocks imposed upon such a model, the cycles would increase over time (Samuelson
1947, pp. 268-69). This does not apply to nonlinear models, which can produce recurrent cycles
with bounded variances, as shown for a Kaldor-type model by L. Klein and R. S. Preston (1969).45 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
random but continual disturbances is such that what would otherwise be
damped (fading) oscillations are converted into the recurrent business cycles.
This hypothesis (which was suggested earlier by Wicksell and Slutsky) gained
much recognition in recent theoretical writings and it particularly influenced
the work ofmacroeconometric model builders.
Several econometric models ofthe U.S. economy in the post-world War II
period have been found generally noncyclical in the absence ofoutside distur-
bances, as shown by simulation studies (I. Adelman and F. Adelman 1959;
Hickman 1972). But random shocks applied to the more recent quarterly mod-
els proved to be insufficient to generate movements with the observed cyclical
properties; to induce fluctuations in these models, it was necessary to use
serially correlated disturbances (Zamowitz, Boschan, and Moore 1972; How-
rey 1972). Moreover, even the best simulations show only residual cyclical
elements, much weaker than those found in the historical series used in the
estimation ofthe models. This could be due to errors in either the structure of
the models orthe estimates ofthe disturbances or both. 30
It should be noted that the large macroeconometric models used primarily
for short-term forecasting are frequently and extensively revised, and the
more recent versions of them may well be substantially more cyclical. Simu-
lation ofone commercially successful model suggests that random noise from
equation errors accounts for only 7% of an overall measure of "cyclicality"
and that some two thirds ofthe latter would remain even with stable monetary
policy, no financial disintermediation "crunches," and no oil price shocks
(Eckstein and Sinai 1986).
The validity ofthe evidence from macroeconometric models which appear
to refute the endogenous cycle and favor the random shock theory is, for these
and other reasons, open to doubts. Thus Blatt (1978) constructed artificial
time series on income, consumption, and investment based on Hicks's model
with a high accelerator, implying unstable behavior. An econometric analysis
ofthese data shows that they are seemingly well explained by a linear model
with random shocks, which has a low accelerator yielding stable conditions.
The problem is attributed to the limitations oflinear models (Hicks's theory is
essentially nonlinear). 31
Business cycles interact with long-term trends in varied and subtle ways, so
the separation ofthe two is difficult conceptually and empirically (see chapter
30. Parameters that may well vary with changes in policy regimes (Lucas 1976), the structure
ofthe economy, and major departures from average cyclical patterns are estimated as constant by
the models. Models estimated with data from periods with mild business cycles such as those of
the 1950s and 1960s are known to be unable to reproduce much more violent fluctuations such as
those ofthe 1930s (Zellner and Peck 1973).
31. Further, Blatt (1980) argues that the random shock theory is inconsistent with the evidence
that deviations of many economic time series from smooth long-term trends show a pronounced
asymmetry: the rises tend to be longer than the declines and also smaller per unit period. The
measures are based on long monthly time series examined in trend-adjusted form by Bums and
Mitchell (1946, ch. 7).46 Chapter 1\\'0
7). Decompositions using purely deterministic (say, log-linear) trends ignore
such interactions, for example, the imprint that major cycles leave on the
growth rates for some considerable time. Cyclical analyses based on devia-
tions from such trends are suspect on statistical grounds (Nelson and Plosser
1982). The proposed alternative is to use stochastic trends approximated by
random walks, but this means in practice that most ofthe contractions as well
as expansions are included in such trend constructs, whereas the residual com-
ponents labeled the "cycle" are largely pure noise (Beveridge and Nelson
1981). There is no good economic theory to justify this way oflooking at the
world.
The regularities reviewed in section 2.2 of this paper cannot be reconciled
with the suggestion made by Fisher in 1925 and reviewed by McCulloch
(1975, p. 303) that business cycles resemble "the cycles superstitious gam-
blers believe they can discern in their luck at casinos like the one at Monte
Carlo." As shown by McCulloch, once an expansion or contraction has ex-
ceeded its minimum historical duration, the probability of its being reversed
in a given month is independent ofits age. But that is merely a proofofnon-
periodicity, not of randomness, of the fluctuations called "business cycles."
Endogenous processes can still bring about the downturns and upturns, but
they interact with all types of random and serially correlated outside events,
which makes the timing of the reversals unpredictable (cf. Matthews 1959,
pp. 199-205).32
Certainly, the processes and relations economists study are in general sto-
chastic, and purely deterministic explanations ofmacroeconomic movements
cannot be sufficient. But purely stochastic explanations have no theoretical
content, and it is the factors which can be integrated in an economic theory
that are naturally ofprimary interest to any economist who attempts to under-
stand the nature and causes ofbusiness cycles.
In the generally prosperous times after World War II, however, business
cycles slipped way down in the public and professional interest. The weight
ofthe public sector increased greatly throughout the industrialized world, and
government actions and policies attracted growing attention as a likely source
of large macroeconomic effects, notably the rising inflation. The idea that
business contractions are also policy induced and episodic rather than a part
ofself-sustaining cycles seemed increasingly plausible.
Even while the style of macroeconomic analysis and policy remained pre-
dominantly Keynesian, the theory soon veered sharply away from the un-
stable accelerator-multiplier models to concepts that imputed much more sta-
bility to the private sector. This evolution shows up strongly in Duesenberry
32. Such processes include those arising from particular historical and institutional develop-
ments, for example, the "misintermediation" practice ofbanks and thrift institutions which Mc-
Culloch elsewhere (1977, 1981) asserts are a cause of financial instability and recurrent, if non-
periodic, business fluctuations. Similarly, Irving Fisher's debt-deflation hypothesis of the 1930s
treats the business cycle problem much more seriously than his writings in the 1920s.47 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
1958. 33 The notion ofstrong cyclical effects from high values ofthe accelera-
tor and multiplier was further deflated by new theoretical developments: the
permanent income and life-cycle hypotheses of consumption and the "neo-
classical" models ofinvestment. Used along with adaptive expectations react-
ing only gradually to past events, these formulations suggested relatively
stable trends in private demands. The rise of monetarism (see next section)
worked in the same direction.
Historically, the main substantive differences among the theories centered
on the relative importance ofreal versus monetary factors. This can be linked
to the distinction between the impulses and the propagation mechanism, intro-
duced formally by Frisch in 1933. There can be models with monetary shocks
and real propagation, models with real shocks and monetary propagation, and
various mixtures of the two. Even in the largely endogenous theories it is
sometimes possible to differentiate in a somewhat similar manner between the
mainly originating factors and the mainly conditioning or response factors. 34
In sum, the several dichotomies encountered in modem business cycle dy-
namics intersect in various ways, and the extant theories actually represent
many of the possible resulting combinations. They generally resist being
neatly characterized by these categories, but even attempts at approximations
can be instructive. A few illustrations for some theories, lightly treated above,
are given in table 2.5. (See the first four cases; the others refer to materials to
be discussed later.)
2.4.2 The Monetarist Interpretation of Business Fluctuations
In the 1960s, the rise ofmonetarism mounted a frontal challenge to Keynes-
ian economics, starting from the simple quantity-theoretic proposition:
changes in the stock ofmoney are the main determinant ofchanges in nominal
income. The demand for money is a relatively stable function linking real
balances to wealth or permanent income and to expected rates of return on
money and alternative assets. Given significant lags in wage and price adjust-
ments, sequences of alternating phases of high and low growth rates in the
quantity ofmoney lead to corresponding fluctuations in aggregate demand and
real economic activity relative to the secular trends. Sufficiently long periods
oflow but predominantly positive monetary growth rates are likely to produce
business slowdowns or recessions; sufficiently long periods of negative mon-
etary growth rates lead to depressions (Friedman and Schwartz 1963a,
1963b).35
33. In this relatively disaggregate and complex theory, growth is explained by the interaction of
a capital-adjustment process with autonomous investment, downturns by the operation ofvarious
exogenous factors, and upturns by the corrective forces inherent in the basically stable system.
34. The idea is found in Pigou 1927, p. 8, A. M. Hansen (1964, chs. 17 and 18) applies it to
the work by Wicksell, Aftalion, Pigou, and J. M. Clark.
35. Of course, monetarism (like Keynesianism) has come to denote a broad assortment of
theoretical concepts and empirical propositions attributed to economists who agree in some re-
spects and disagree in others. Here there is need only for a selective treatment ofthese character-48 Chapter Two
The lags ofoutput behind the monetary changes are seen as variable but, on
the average, lengthy. This is so because, say, an accelerated increase in the
quantity ofmoney must first alter the relative prices or yields on a broad range
ofassets. The resulting discrepancies between the actual and the desired port-
folios prompt the banks and the public to take corrective actions. The stimulus
would eventually spread to product markets, causing rises in payments for
services of, and the investments in, nonfinancial assets. As spending, income,
and prices rise, interest rates will snap back from their earlier decline. Ifprice
expectations are adaptive, that is, subject to lagged error corrections, people
will tend to underestimate the rising prices; hence they will overestimate their
real money balances for some time. This will induce more transitory spending
to liquidate the extra amounts of "redundant" money, and in the process, the
rates ofrise in prices and nominal income will overshoot the new equilibrium
paths for these variables. 36 Thus, even in the case of a single shock, some
cyclical (presumably damped) reaction may well occur.
The rate of growth of output or real income corresponding to full employ-
ment (or the "natural unemployment rate") is exogenous in this model, being
determined by real factors. The monetarist theory ofmacroeconomic fluctua-
tions deals with deviations of output from this trend, that is, with "growth
cycles." 37
The early and still influential versions of this theory, due largely to Fried-
man, treat monetary changes-growth rates or deviations from trend of the
quantity ofmoney-as if they were predominantly autonomous, that is, hav-
ing strong one-way effects on movements in total spending, income, and out-
put. The reverse effects, from business activity to money, are recognized to
exist but only as secondary "feedbacks." The main source ofcritical monetary
disturbances is thus located outside the private economy, in policy actions and
institutional changes. Private expenditures, including business investment,
are viewed as essentially stable, except when affected by the money shocks:
when undisturbed, they tend to be consistent, in real terms, with the natural
rates ofemployment and output.
This is a new emphasis. Earlier monetary theories generally gave most at-
tention to private-sector instabilities, particularly credit fluctuations. The dif-
ferences are highlighted in table 2.5 above (see also, section 2.3.1).
This brings us to the subject of the determinants of money supply. Under
istics inasmuch as they bear on the evolution ofthe work on business cycles. (For comprehensive
surveys, see R. 1. Gordon 1974; Stein 1976; Mayeret al. 1978.)
36. These paths would run parallel but higher than the new equilibrium path for the money
stock, because at a higher rate ofprice rise less money in real terms would be demanded relative
to wealth and income (Friedman and Schwartz 1963b; Friedman 1970b).
37. The equilibrium or trend level ofoutput in this sense is associated with less than full utili-
zation of resources; hence, it can be either higher or lower than the actual level ofoutput at any
time. This is unlike the concept ofa "ceiling" imposed on output by full employment (as in Hicks
1950).49 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
the present fiduciary standard, money consists of currency and, mainly, de-
posits in private banks. Monetary authorities can affect the quantity ofmoney
only indirectly and over time, by trying to control the monetary base (bank
reserves plus currency). Subject to legal or regulatory constraints, banks vary
their reserve-to-deposits ratios and the public their currency-to-deposits ratios
in response to actual and expected changes in interest rates, real income, and
probably some other indicators, (e.g., those of business and consumer confi-
dence). In principle, then, a supply function for money in nominal units can
be derived, involving the policy-related base and a few endogenous determi-
nants of the money multiplier (ratio of the money stock to the base). The
stability of this function is an empirical question on which there is significant
disagreement. 38 However, there is a substantial consensus, not only among
monetarists, that any effects that interest rates, wealth, or income may have
on the nominal money supply are much weaker and less consistent than the
effects ofthese variables on the demand for real balances. Moreover, monetar-
ist studies argue that central banks have the power and tools to exercise the
dominant influence upon the money stock, except in the very short run.
The potential for an autonomous monetary policy is generally overesti-
mated by analysts who concentrate on the United States, the only large market
economy in which balance-of-payments considerations could long be treated
as secondary even under fixed exchange rates. For any small economy under
this regime, the nominal money supply depends on changes in the available
foreign exchange reserves; it must tend to be consistent with prices and in-
comes that will balance the country's international payments and hence cannot
be determined independently by domestic authorities. Under the gold stan-
dard, a business expansion would come to a halt when the drain of cash and
shortage ofgold reserves forced the banking system to curtail credit on a suf-
ficiently large scale. This was the ultimate source of the relatively large and
regular British cycles in the nineteenth century for Marshall, Hawtrey, and
Lavington.
An early expectation that the monetarist approach may ultimately produce
a theory of"apartly self-generating cyclical mechanism. . . including a feed-
back in the rate of change in money itself" (Friedman and Schwartz 1963b,
p. 64) has remained unfulfilled. The feedback, or "reflex influence," run-
ning from business activity to monetary growth has not been analytically de-
veloped and integrated into a theory of how money, prices, and real factors
interact in the short run. The approach produced instead an essentially
38. Cagan (1965) shows that high-powered money fluctuated more erratically than, and often
opposite to, the currency and reserve ratios. One source ofthe interrelation is indirect-common
response to business cycles; another is direct-central-bank operations designed to stabilize the
economy. He finds that "the dependence of the money stock on prices and business activity, as
well as on other variables, is strong but is neither rigid, uniform, nor immediate" (p. 16). Fried-
man and Schwartz stress that "neither interest rates nor real income have a consistent and sizable
influence on the nominal quantity of money supplied" (1982, p. 35). On the other hand, Brunner















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































exogenous and monetary model of the business cycle. Yet the same studies
that show an important, independent role of money, particularly in major in-
flationary booms and severe deflationary slumps, also find much evidence that
fluctuations in the monetary variables reflect those in real aggregates, partic-
ularly in mild cycles (summarized by Cagan 1965, p. 294). The primacy of
the monetary effects cannot be established by the less-than-compelling argu-
ment that since money plays a key role in the major cycles, it should also be
important in the minor cycles, which are just "less virulent members of the
same species" (Friedman and Schwartz 1963b, p. 55).
The idea that cyclical instability is mainly policy induced is not an integral
part of, or a necessary inference from, the monetarist theory. It is an empirical
judgment held by some monetarists as well as other economists. 39 The popu-
larity of this view rose in the late 1960s and 1970s, when both inflation and
unemployment drifted upward, the Phillips curve moved north-to-northeast
through a series of clockwise cycle-related loops, and failures of attempted
stabilization policies were evident. Rather paradoxically, the 1970s also wit-
nessed the culmination of belief in the power ofmacroeconomic policies that
took the conceptual form of a "political business cycle," which is not of
monetarist origin. 40
Monetarist models can acquire some cyclical dynamics by combining an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with the quantity-theoretic demand for
money function. Laidler (1973a) presents an intentionally simple model of
this type, with exogenous monetary growth, the full-employment output rate,
and adaptive expectations of inflation. The causation runs from lagged and
current money growth rates and current inflation to the change in output, then
back to inflation, and so on, recursively. The model generates a cyclical move-
ment in output and inflation (relative to their natural and expected values,
respectively) in response to a single shift in the rate of monetary expansion.
Laidler notes that its simulations leave much to be desired, probably in large
part because ofthe missing variables, particularly the interest rate. 41
39. Consider the following statement by authors who contributed much to the development of
the money supply function: HOur version of monetarism does not deny that ifexogenous shocks
take the form of government policies, including fiscal policies, the system may oscillate or even
explode into inflation or cumulative deflation. Our proposition asserts that cyclical instability is
mainly the product ofgovernment policies that are imposed on a stabilizing private sector" (Brun-
ner and Meltzer in 1. Stein 1976, p. 180).
40. The political models of business cycles maintain several strong and questionable assump-
tions. (1) Policymakers know the structure ofthe economy; the public does not. (2) The inflation-
unemployment short-run trade-off can be exploited effectively by the party in power. (3) Voters
are myopic and concerned with the current electoral period only. Thus the government is capable
offine-tuning the economy periodically. It is not surprising that these models, though ingenious,
find little support in facts. The related evidence is mixed and generally inconclusive: Nordhaus
1975; Lindbeck 1976; MacRae 1977; also Fels 1977; Moore 1977a; Tufte 1978. A very useful,
balanced overview is given in Alt and Chrystal 1983, esp., ch. 5.
41. For a corresponding theoretical analysis ofa model for a small open economy under fixed
exchange rates, see Laidler 1975, ch. 9.53 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
2.4.3 Price Misperceptions and Intertemporal Substitution of Labor
Adaptive expectations often imply long lags of adjustment and persistence
of apparently systematic errors. Critics regard models that yield such results
as ad hoc and inconsistent with optimizing behavior. They accept instead the
view that "expectations are essentially the same as the predictions ofthe rele-
vant economic theory" (Muth 1961, p. 316). Application of this rational ex-
pectations hypothesis (REH) to macroeconomics was part ofa new, ambitious
program ofwork undertaken in the 1970s by several economists following the
initiative of Lucas (1972). The objective was to develop a general business
cycle theory in strict adherence to the basic principles of the analysis of eco-
nomic equilibrium: consistent pursuit of self-interest by individuals and con-
tinuous clearing ofall markets by relative prices. 42
Under REH, the route of the older monetarist theory which used adaptive
expectations to help explain the duration of cyclical movements is closed.
Expectations are now taken to be free ofany bias and subject to random errors
only. All persistent monetary changes, inasmuch as they are predictable, will
be correctly anticipated and met directly by proportional changes in prices and
related nominal variables. Only random monetary impulses can lead to price
surprises and miscalculations, which, in this view, are necessary to explain
any cyclical movements in real variables.
The short-run aggregate supply function for labor (Lucas and Rapping
1969) is upward sloping relative to the deviations of the current level of real
wages from their expected (discounted future) level. It is seen as typically
elastic, reflecting strong competitive incentives to take advantage oftemporar-
ily higher rates ofreal return. Since the substitutability ofleisure over time is
high, a small change in the return on the current work effort can induce a large
change, in the same direction, in the amount ofwork done. This intertemporal
substitution hypothesis (ISH) plays a central role in the recent attempts to
explain employment fluctuations as an aggregate result of individual choices
on the supply side ofthe labor market.
By an analogous argument, firms are expected to vary their output posi-
tively in response to transitory changes in their selling prices, provided that
these are seen as relative or real price changes and not equated with general
inflation. But they would likewise vary their output inversely in response to
transitory changes in the relative prices oftheir inputs, particularly labor. The
basic equilibrium model of business cycles disregards this complication by
42. See Lucas 1973, 1975, 1977; Sargent and Wallace 1975, 1976; Sargent 1976a; Barro 1976,
1980; Lucas and Sargent 1978. Lucas (1977, p. 7) cites Hayek (1933) as an "intellectual ancestor"
who posed the problem ofexplaining the business cycle as part, not a contradiction, ofthe equilib-
rium theory. This was indeed Hayek's intent, but it is also correct to characterize his solution as a
theory ofmonetary disequilibrium and an unstable cumulative process, with excessive credit cre-
ation causing distortions of relative prices and the structure of production (as Hayek 1933 and
1939 are commonly interpreted).54 Chapter Two
simply combining workers and firms into a single group. The representative
worker-entrepreneur then generally supplies more (less) ofboth labor and out-
put when faced with an unanticipated rise (fall) in selling prices.
This approach, by eliminating other prime suspects ofearlier business cycle
theories (including real disturbances, which are viewed as dispersed and lo-
calized), places a heavy explanatory burden on a single causal chain: random
monetary shocks induce price misperceptions, which induce wrong produc-
tion decisions. By assumption, prices other than those in one's own market
are known to anyone only with a lag ofone unit period ofunspecified length.
Agents have complete and timely local information but only incomplete and
lagging information about other "island" markets (Phelps 1970) and about
economy-wide aggregates such as the money stock and the overall price level.
Suppose now that an unanticipated acceleration in monetary growth occurs,
raising prices in general; then the representative worker-entrepreneur first ob-
serves a higher selling price than he expected, takes it to be in some part a
temporary increase in his relative price or real rate of return, and raises his
output in accordance with the ISH. These reactions prevail whenever the ob-
served prices tum out to be higher than the level most producers had expected
on the basis ofprevious information. In the opposite situation ofprices having
proved lower than expected, output is, on the average, reduced. The random
forecasting errors are unavoidable and can be recognized only after the outside
price data become available. However, by then many erroneous decisions will
already have been made, and the necessary revisions and corrections will also
involve time and costs.
The model of the "representative producer," with its fusion of worker and
employer, assumes that labor and business recognize that their interests gen-
erally coincide, or at least act as if they did. This is not consistent with the
strong evidence ofsignificant patterns ofcyclical behavior in cost-price-profit
relationships (sees. 2.2 and 2.3.5). These observations can best be interpreted
with the commonsense assumption that firms and workers pursue their own
interests in reacting rationally to changing business and labor market condi-
tions. 43
The issue of the relative timing of output prices versus input costs can be
reduced to an informational problem in a number of ways. It might be as-
sumed that firms have more immediate knowledge of price changes than
workers or, more generally, that the representative producer unit (firm or
worker) knows the prices of things it sells better than the prices of things it
buys (Friedman 1968). If so, then inflation will be stimulative because it is
largely unanticipated by workers or buyers (or, which is much the same, be-
cause it is recognized sooner in output prices than in input costs). Some critics
43. To be sure, the interests of workers and employers may coincide in some respects and are
reconciled in negotiated or implicit contracts (sec. 2.4.7).55 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
view these assumed informational asymmetries as arbitrary specifications (B.
Friedman, comment on Lucas and Sargent 1978, p. 76; Tobin 1980, p. 42).
The equilibrium approach to business cycles can be explained well in gen-
eral terms (Lucas 1977) and restated simply. (See the text above and the cap-
sule description in table 2.5.) The individual models based on the REH and
the ISH, however, are much too diverse, experimental, and complex to lend
themselves to such verbal summarization. Some of them use changes in cur-
rent prices relative to the next period's expected price level to induce intertem-
poral substitution on the supply side (Lucas 1972, 1973; Sargent and Wallace
1975). Others allow for the existence ofassets that earn a nominal interest rate
and add that rate to the above price surprise term to obtain a measure ofantic-
ipated one-period real rate ofreturn. This relative price variable then appears
with a positive sign as a determinant of supply and with a negative sign as a
determinant ofdemand (Barro 1980). 44
The general criticism of the price misperception hypothesis is that it re-
quires long informational lags, which are even less likely under rational than
under adaptive expectations. Ample, frequent, and low-cost monetary and
price statistics are now available, so informational confusion ofthe type here
hypothesized can only be short lived and associated with random changes, not
persistent cyclical fluctuations, in output and employment (Hall 1975, 1980b;
Tobin 1977; Modigliani 1977). True, this argument is partly countered by the
observation that there are indeed serious deficiencies in these and other impor-
tant data on the economy, which in many cases are reduced only through a
time-consuming sequence of revisions. This can distort initial expectations
and delay successful signal detection for several months (Zarnowitz 1982c).
Still, informational lags are surely much shorter than the average cyclical
movements, so they alone cannot account for the duration of the observed
fluctuations (Okun 1980) or, one may add, for the large size of procyclical
fluctuations in corporate profits and stock prices. Beginning with an economy
at full employment,45 most errors caused by temporary misperceptions of
monetary and price changes would be detected and corrected before they
could give rise to large cumulative income movements in either direction.
Finally, the knowledge ofthe nominal interest rates, a set oftimely and global
variables, may convey information about the unobserved part of money
growth (King 1983; Barro 1980).46
44. The net effect ofa rise in this composite variable, then, will be to stimulate output ifon the
aggregate across the markets, the induced increase in supply is larger than the induced decrease in
demand. This formulation takes into account the debate about the direction ofinformational asym-
metries noted in the preceding paragraph ofthe text.
45. It is against the spirit ofthe new equilibrium theory (and some older scholars such as Hayek
and other Austrians) to start an attempted explanation ofbusiness cycles by postulating an initial
state ofrecession.
46. This prompts Barro (l981a, p. 51) to observe that the "stress on confusions between tem-
porary and permanent monetary shocks has been overdone. The real effects of temporary, but56 Chapter 1\vo
The criticism ofthe ISH centers on observations said to be inconsistent with
continuous equilibrium in the labor market (e.g., Okun 1980). Thus during
recessions and depressions, indefinite layoffs and involuntary separations ac-
count for most ofthe rise in unemployment. More people are looking for work
at current (or even lower) wages over longer average time periods. Fewer
people quit their jobs as vacancies drop.
General critiques, however, have limited power of persuasion, particularly
against strong priors ofthe economic equilibrium theory. It is therefore partic-
ularly important that the hypotheses under consideration have been subjected
to various tests, in large part by their proponents.
In one set of tests, the reaction function of monetary authorities was esti-
mated by regressing the rate of growth in money on its own past values and
selected lagged variables, and identifying the residuals from this regression
with the "unanticipated" component ofmonetary change (Barro 1977b, 1978;
Barro and Rush 1980). These tests could not reject the joint hypotheses of
rationality and neutrality of money, but many doubts were raised about the
specification and identifiability ofBarro's reaction function as well as its con-
sistency with private andpublic rational behavior. 47
The neutrality hypothesis that anticipated money growth has no real effects
is strongly rejected by tests reported by Mishkin (1982). Here, anticipated as
well unanticipated money growth influences output and unemployment, with
lags ofup to 20 quarters. 48
Data on monetary aggregates are available promptly and often (now
weekly) but they are also repeatedly revised. The revisions are frequently
large relative to the average rates of money growth, but on the whole, they
appear to be random. They are interpreted as "components of unperceived
monetary movements" and found to have no significant real effects (Barro and
Hercovitz 1980). Economic agents should not be assumed to be ignorant of
the current monetary values for which they do have usable approximations.
And, contrary to the RE-IS models, in which prices are fully flexible, output
is in fact positively associated with these measured and knowable values of
the money stock (King 1981; Boschen and Grossman 1982; McCallum 1982).
The early tests by Lucas and Rapping (1969) favor the ISH but they are
based on adaptive expectations. When reestimated by Altonji (1982) under
perceived, money shocks would be eliminated by the appropriate adjustment in the nominal rate
ofreturn."
47. See the comments by Blinder, R. J. Gordon, Weintraub, and Fischer in S. Fischer, ed.
1980, pp. 49-72 and 219-21. On the related basic problems of"observational equivalence" and
testability, see also Sargent 1976b; and Sims 1980b.
48. It is these longer lags that are primarily responsible for Mishkin's conclusion being the
opposite of that reached in the Barro papers, where lags of 2 years or 10 quarters are used. No
attempts to rationalize the persistence of such long distributed lags under the REH are made in
any ofthese reports. See also Nelson 1981 on the dependence ofunemployment on lagged values
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rational expectations and a variety of alternative assumptions about agents'
information sets, the results generally fail to support the ISH. 49 Weak negative
effects ofa price surprise term on the unemployment rate are reported by Sar-
gent (1976a) but disputed by Fair (1979); there are simultaneity problems with
these estimates, as shown by Barro (1980). These and other tests (Hall 1979)
are admitted to be rudimentary and on the whole inconclusive; all participants
in this work stress that it presents great difficulties. Still, for the most part,
other recent tests addressed to certain manageable aspects ofthe problem have
produced negative results (K. Clark and Summers 1982; Mankiw, Rotemberg
and Summers 1982).
To sum up, the evidence can be fairly described, on balance, as unfavorable
to the theories here considered. This has led to some reassessments on the part
of their authors. Thus, Barro (1981a, p. 74) expresses "doubts about the ex-
planatory value for business cycles of currently available equilibrium theo-
ries." 50 McCallum (1982, p. 4.) argues that the evidence requires abandon-
ment of "flexible-price equilibrium models" but not of the "equilibrium
approach to macroeconomic analysis," which can rationalize sticky or slowly
adjusting wages and prices.
2.4.4 Cyclical Persistence and Extensions ofthe Equilibrium Models
Can random monetary shocks produce persistent fluctuations ofreal aggre-
gates in an economy with market clearing and incomplete information? Those
who deny it attack mainly the ISH as leading to misguided attempts to repre-
sent business cycles as a "moving equilibrium" (Modigliani 1977; Tobin
1977, 1980; Solow 1980). Some expect that the postulate ofcontinuous mar-
ket clearing will have to be abandoned in the RE models (Okun 1980; R. J.
Gordon 1981).
Equilibrium theorists recognize that the basic ingredients of their models
are not sufficient to produce the persistent movements in output and employ-
ment which occur during the business cycle. However, they point out that
random shocks to aggregate demand can be converted into persistent move-
ments by suitable propagation mechanisms, as in Frisch 1933. Further, Lucas
and Sargent (1978, pp. 65-67) argue that some devices of this type have al-
ready been incorporated in the equilibrium models, and others are likely to be
developed.
The first of these propagation mechanisms relates to the familiar observa-
tion that rapid adjustments of employment and production rates are costly.
49. "For most specifications, the current real wage, the expected future real wage, and the
expected real rate ofinterest are either insignificantly related to unemployment and labour supply
or have the wrong sign" (Altonji 1982, p. 784; Altonji and Ashenfelter 1980).
50. He hastens to add that these doubts "do not constitute support for Keynesian disequilibrium
analysis," which is incomplete and even more questionable. His argument implies that there are
only two sides to the debate, the "new classical macroeconomics" and "Keynesian macroeconom-
ics." This is a widespread but mistaken and, in my opinion, much too restrictive point ofview.58 Chapter Two
Accordingly, firms respond with lags to the relative price signals they per-
ceive. 51 In practice, modeling the cost-of-adjustment effects takes the form of
making the demands for factors of production depend partly on their own
lagged values. It is important to note that this mechanism is entirely different
from and extraneous to that of the random price misperception effects. The
latter should not be spread over time by the old device ofdistributed lags. The
unit period here is defined by the lag ofdata on the nominal aggregates which
was already shown to be relatively short. The logic ofthis approach seems to
leave no good reasons for extending the lag to more than one period and so
opening up the possibility of autocorrelated forecast errors. Cost-of-
adjustment models may provide a rationale for more complex and longer lags.
However, in a world without uncertainty about the probability distributions
governing the future (see next section), where markets clear continuously,
leaving no unexploited opportunities for gain, there should be little ground for
any sizable distributed lags in economic decision making (Poole 1976).
Another propagation device incorporates a form of an investment accelera-
tor (Lucas 1975). Positive price surprises induce not only increases in current
employment and output but also acquisition of additional capital. Capacity is
supposed to increase promptly during a period when the nature ofthe shock is
not yet recognized. This increment to the stock of capacity raises labor pro-
ductivity and temporarily increases the demand for labor and the supply of
commodities; it also retards the general price increase, thereby delaying the
recognition of, or adjustment to, the initial shock. Thus a persistence effect is
created.
This formulation also poses some major problems. Many capital invest-
ment projects involve indivisibilities, high costs and risks, and gestation pe-
riods measured in years and quarters, not months. Decisions to initiate them
are unlikely to depend on isolated signals that could well prove false after a
short information lag (R. J. Gordon 1981, p. 510). Not surprisingly, random
monetary disturbances and price misperceptions have not attracted much at-
tention in the literature as potentially important determinants of investment;
instead, expectations have-based on systematic changes in demand, profits,
credit, and cost of capital. In this class of models neglect of these factors
deprives the treatment ofbusiness capital investment ofmuch interest.
Furthermore, because ofthe relatively long ordering and construction lags,
investment will tend to add to demand before it adds to capacity. The effects
ofincreased capacity on supply, prices, and the anticipated real rate ofreturn
on capital are delayed. It must be recalled, too, that capacity itself normally
continues to increase during recessions; it is investment and the rate ofcapac-
ity utilization that are highly sensitive, cyclically. In models that concentrate
51. It should be noted that such lags could also rationalize a dynamic model of fluctuations in
employment and output that is purely "real", that is, independent of the behavior of money and
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on monetary and price effects on the stock of capital, which is presumably
optimally utilized throughout (as is the stock of labor), the role of the refor-
mulated "accelerator" would seem to be quite limited.
In models with lagging information, the effects ofpurely random monetary-
price shocks do not cumulate: the responses peak in the first period and de-
cline gradually thereafter (Lucas 1975, p. 202). This feature is not changed
by the introduction ofinvestment as long as new capital is installed with a lag
ofone period only. But these timing specifications are very unrealistic. There
is strong evidence that investment in plant and equipment requires, on the
average, about seven quarters to complete, with few projects taking less than
1year (Mayer 1960; Zamowitz 1973, pp. 505-19; Hall, 1977).
Kydland and Prescott (1980, 1982) use the "time to build" new capital
stocks as a feature oftechnology which dictates the number ofperiods needed
to produce durable producer and consumer goods. These lags are treated as
policy invariant and constant for a given type of capital. (This is unlike the
observed delivery lags on these goods, which vary procyclically with back-
logs of orders: Popkin 1965; Zamowitz 1973, pt. 3; Carlton 1979.) Time to
build contributes to the persistence of output movements over the multiple
periods required to produce the finished capital goods (unfinished goods are
not part of the productive stocks). The models used in this work rely on an
intertemporal labor supply function and are driven basically by real shocks
that affect technology and the productivity ofthe representative worker. 52
Investment realizations are a distributed-lag function of investment plans.
But the series ofnew capital appropriations and contracts and orders for plant
and equipment that proxy for investment plans are also serially correlated like
the expenditures that follow them, only less so (e.g., Zamowitz 1973). Hence
they lack the random shock property which the equilibrium theorists look for
in "an essential propagator of business cycle fluctuations" (John Taylor in
Fischer 1980, p. 192). Nevertheless they are an important link in the cyclical
process. The lag of investment expenditures behind investment decisions is
an essential element in several otherwise quite different theories of business
cycles (Mitchell 1913; Kalecki 1935; Hicks 1950).
Inventory investment provides still another potential channel for persist-
ence effects in equilibrium models. In Blinder and Fischer (1981), an unantic-
ipated rise in money and prices leads firms to sell out of inventories at the
same time as they increase output. In subsequent periods, production is grad-
ually raised to restock the depleted inventories. More specifically, inventory
investment depends positively on the excess ofthe desired stock (N: - N) and
inversely on the price surprise term (Pt - P~_I). The aggregate supply function
52. The real shocks have permanent (autocorrelated) and transitory components; the former
also contribute to the cumulative movements or "momentum" in employment and output. The
1980 paper by Kydland and Prescott includes random shocks to nominal wages as well, but these
monetary disturbances are secondary. The 1982 model contains real shocks only.60 Chapter 1\vo
has Q t vary positively with Q~ and the same price surprise (as in Lucas 1972,
1973) but now also with (N; - Nt). The desired inventory N; will stimulate
activity, but a rise in Nt relative to N; will discourage it. Even with N* a
constant, this model can account for some serial correlation of output. With
interest-sensitive N;, larger fluctuations would result since even fully antici-
pated changes in money would have some real effects (Blinder and Fischer
1981, sec. 5).
This approach draws on some old ideas about the aggregate sales-
inventory-income nexus in business cycles (sec. 2.3.5) and combines them
with elements of the new equilibrium models for a rather uneasy match. It
needs to be recalled, too, that the role ofinventory adjustments is large during
mild recessions and slowdowns, such as prevailed in the post-World War II
period, but is otherwise supporting rather than central (Blinder and Holtz-
Eakin 1984).
Summing up, the cost-motivated adjustments lags, durability and long ges-
tation periods of capital goods, and desired inventory effects have all been
long recognized as important in studies of business cycles. These elements,
however, do not exactly mesh with the basic core of the equilibrium model.
The random monetary shocks and price surprises have smaller and less intel-
ligible parts to play, while the real factors in the "propagation" processes
move to the center of the stage. These extensions, indeed, "may undermine
the quantitative role of the underlying intertemporal substitution mechanism
as the basis for fluctuations in output and employment" (Barro 1981a, p. 49).
2.4.5 Rationality, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
To be "rational" in a technical sense, expectations must be consistent with
the structure ofthe given model. Unless they are self-fulfilling, on the whole,
the model of behavior assumed to be ruled by them is vitiated. Given the
relevant information set, it may be possible to solve a RE model for its equi-
librium path over all futures. As new information becomes available, the
forecast-solution is updated. Used as a principle of modeling dynamic sto-
chastic equilibria, RE gained wide popularity and produced important new
insights. 53
However, even in relatively simple linear models, the computational prob-
lems posed by this radically logical approach are often formidable. Using RE
as a model of actual behavior cannot mean imputing to economic agents gen-
erally the ability to solve such problems. Rather it is the.markets that are
supposed to work as ifthey somehow approximated this capacity. This could
53. These include the criticism of some aspects of macroeconometric models, the analysis of
competitive markets with imperfect information, and work on the consequences of endogenous
expectations for the effectiveness ofeconomic policies (Lucas 1976; Poole 1976). These matters
lie outside the scope ofthis chapter. Assessments ofthe RE models abound (Shiller 1978; Kantor
1979; Fischer 1980; McCallum 1980b). For surveys of the literature and references, see Begg
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be interpreted along the lines of what may be called a weak version of the
REH: market incentives and penalties favor the dominance ofoptimal or cost-
efficient predictions. Firms and individuals whose forecasts are consistently
poor will not be able to survive economically. The anticipations ofthose who
do survive will tend to come true. This implies that predictively valuable in-
formation, on which such anticipations are based, is scarce so that collecting
it is a profitable activity (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).
Such propositions, when applied to well-functioning individual markets,
seem simply good, standard economics. In the aggregate, they need not imply
more than a long-run tendency toward equilibrium, promoted by learning
from experience but inhibited by limited opportunities for controlled experi-
ments. Thus no firm link is established between the type of model and the
expectational hypothesis used. In particular, RE models have been built with-
out the property of continuous market clearing. In principle, various types of
disequilibria could be expected by people and modeled with the aid of RE
methodology; or, if expectational confusions prevail, no unique solutions
should be found.
The REH ofthe macroeconomic literature in the 1970s, however, is a strong
version which adds to the reasonable premise of rational use of costly infor-
mation another assumption-namely, that the available data and models pro-
vide sufficient knowledge about the future such that the prevailing expecta-
tions are free of any systematic errors and consistent with continuous
aggregate equilibrium. Economic behavior is guided by subjective probabili-
ties which agree, on the average, with the true frequencies of the events in
question. Unlike in Knight 1921 and Keynes 1936 there is no uncertainty as
to what these objective probabilities are. 54
Now there seem to be no good a priori reasons why this should generally be
so; indeed, the belief that it is not accounts for most objections to the REH. It
is evident that there is no agreement on what is the "objective" probability
distribution of future outcomes for the economy at any time, since different
theories and models coexist. Another reason why forecasts differ across
people, firms, etc., is that skills to acquire and use information are not evenly
distributed.
Attempts to form rational predictions ofany macrovariable that depends on
anticipatory actions ofmany or all agents in the economy involve adjustments
through a learning process in which not only the individual forecaster's own
beliefs but also those of others are continually evaluated. Each agent, then,
tries to predict the average forecast, or what others are likely to predict that
average will be, and so on. This is the difficult "infinite regress" problem, well
known from the "beauty contest" example of Keynes (1936, p. 156). AI-
54. Indeed, Lucas (1977, p. 15), argues that "in cases ofuncertainty, economic reasoning will
be of no value." For the REH to apply, business cycles must represent "repeated instances of
essentially similar events."62 Chapter Two
though increasingly and ingeniously attacked, this problem is still far from
being fully tractable or understood. However, an important result that is
strongly suggested by this work is that a unique, stable RE equilibrium path,
along which prices continually clear all markets, entails the collective consist-
ency ofindividual plans. But individual rationality (the cornerstone ofmodem
microeconomic analysis) does not necessarily imply such a consistency. 55
In a stochastically stationary environment that has persisted long enough to
be familiar, agents are assumed to have learned all they can about the proba-
bility distributions they face. 56 In the economy as it is, however, change is to
a large extent unanticipated and learning is perpetual. In models with learning
and disparate expectations, convergence to the RE equilibrium requires that
agents know no less than the laws governing the change in the key parameters
of the economy and the effects of exogenous shocks. Learning itself can act
as a cyclical propagator mechanism by including serial and cross-correlations
in forecasts (Townsend 1978, 1983a, 1983b).
The strong assumptions ofprior knowledge are implausible but there seems
to be no alternative to them that would be satisfactory from the RE point of
view. 57 Some simple but flexible rules of adaptive expectations (AE) may be
consistent with optimal learning (Taylor 1975; B. Friedman 1979) and some
models with a common, simple rule converge to an equilibrium solution (e.g.,
Bray 1983). But the collective adherence to a rule which, if individually fol-
lowed, would yield biased forecasts is in conflict with the idea ofthe optimiz-
ing representative agent in a decentralized market economy.
It is important to distinguish between the critique ofthe RE and the critique
of the particular market-clearing models with RE (e.g., Fair 1978). Many
critics agree that the pre-RE treatments ofexpectations are generally arbitrary
and, at least in principle, inferior (Tobin 1980, pp. 28-29; Meltzer 1982, p.
3). Further advances in the intensely used and studied RE methodology are to
be expected (as argued, e.g., in Lucas and Sargent 1978; Lucas 1981; Gross-
man 1981). Still, the claim to general validity ofthe strong form of the REH
as applied to market-clearing macromodels is now rejected by a wide range of
economists (Arrow 1978; Tobin 1980, 1981; Laidler 1981, pp. 11-15; Fried-
man and Schwartz 1982, p. 630).
In the present context, the critical questions concern the stationarity and
predictability of the processes observed during business cycles. Their recur-
rent and sequential nature is indeed well established, but so is their lack of
periodicity and the large intercycle differences in durations and amplitudes
(sec. 2.2). The separability ofbusiness cycles from the long trends can by no
55. See the several essays and the introductory chapter by the editors in Frydman and Phelps
1983.
56. Most ofthe early basic RE models, constructed on this premise, simply contain no learning
processes.
57. Without some such assumptions, convergence may not occureven in single-marketcontexts
(Cyert and DeGroot 1974; B. Friedman 1979; DeCanio 1979).63 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
means be taken for granted. These are arguments against the applicability of
the RE methods. In a nonstationary world with a mixture ofrandom and seri-
ally correlated disturbances, uncertainty in the sense ofKnight and Keynes is
pervasive, even under the (empirically dubious) premises of no structural
change and stable policy regimes.
The monetarist models with AE may be interpreted to contain uncertainty. 58
Meltzer (1982) distinguishes between uncertainty, which is associated with
variations in nonstationary means resulting from "permanent" changes in lev-
els or growth rates, and risk, which is associated with transitory, random de-
viations around stable trends. He argues that the current RE models err in
ignoring uncertainty, which is essential to an explanation ofthe persistence of
cyclical contractions. Models of business cycles should allow permanent
changes to occur but not to be identified immediately. Stochastic shocks,
whether monetary or real, have permanent and transitory components which
cannot be reliably separated (new information reduces but does not eliminate
the confusion). The rational response to the shocks is adaptive, taking the
form of gradual adjustments of beliefs about the permanent values of the en-
dogenous variables. 59
What is the evidence on how people actually form their expectations? Re-
cent work using survey data has been preoccupied with tests for the rationality
of inflation forecasts. Typically, actual values are regressed on predicted val-
ues, and the forecasts fail the tests when (1) the sample intercept and slope
estimates are significantly different from 0 and 1, respectively, and/or (2) the
residual errors are significantly autocorrelated. Data from the semiannual sur-
veys ofeconomic forecasters conducted since 1947 by Joseph A. Livingston,
a syndicated financial columnist, reject the REH according to most of these
and related tests (Pesando 1975; Carlson 1977; Wachtel 1977; Moore 1977b;
Pearce 1979; Gramlich 1983; more favorable results are reported in Mulli-
neaux 1978). Tests ofindividual forecasts confirm those ofthe group average
forecasts, and the results from the quarterly NBER-ASA economic outlook
surveys are consistent with those obtained for the Livingston surveys (Fig-
lewski and Wachtel 1981; see also chapter 16).60
Studies of consumer survey data from the Survey Research Center of the
University of Michigan show mixed but, in large measure, negative results
58. See M. Friedman 1972, pp. 923-24, on uncertainty; Muth 1960; Frenkel 1975; Mussa
1975; Brunner, Cukierman, and Meltzer 1980; Friedman and Schwartz 1982, pp. 415 and 447,
on the rationality and empirical usefulness ofAE.
59. Note that this is a general approach, compatible with Keynesian, monetarist, and other
theories. It is used in the 1980 model ofBrunner et al., in which monetary shocks affect only the
price level and the rate ofinterest, while unemployment is caused by errors due to the inability of
workers to distinguish between permanent and transitory real productivity shocks. This model is
subject to all doubts concerning the hypotheses ofcomplete neutrality ofmoney and intertemporal
substitution in labor supply.
60. The relevant literature on the properties ofexpectational data is voluminous and can be only
briefly summarized here. Fora more comprehensive review ofthe evidence, see Zarnowitz 1984b.64 Chapter Two
(luster 1979; Huizinga 1980; Curtin 1982; Gramlich 1983). The same applies
to surveys of business executives (de Leeuw and McKelvey 1981) and Euro-
pean and lapanese surveys (Aiginger 1981; Papadia 1982; Visco 1984).61
Few authors have tested data on anticipations for variables other than infla-
tion. U.S. manufacturers' sales expectations have been on the whole nega-
tively assessed in a comprehensive study by Hirsch and Lovell (1969), more
positively by Pashigian (1964) and Irvine (1981). For professional economic
forecasters, including econometric service bureaus, there is strong evidence
that predictions of inflation in the 1970s have been generally biased, while
those of other important aggregates (growth in nominal and real GNP, the
unemployment rate) pass the rationality tests much more frequently and better
(see chapter 16; also McNees 1978).62
The REH finds the strongest support in the "efficient markets" literature
(Fama 1970; Poole 1976). This is readily understandable since financial assets
and commodities are traded in well-organized and informed competitive auc-
tion markets. However, some tests of forecasts by active participants in these
markets reject the REH, as shown in the survey of Wall Street predictions of
interest rates by B. Friedman (1980). This could merely mean that this survey
was not adequately representative ofthe most successful traders and hence of
the market.63
Expectations which fail the rationality criteria in ex post tests may well
prove entirely consistent with optimizing ex ante behavior once the conse-
quences of uncertainty, unique events, defective models, and fragmentary or
costly information are taken into account (Zamowitz 1982c). Also, they need
not be adaptive or otherwise backward looking only. In fact, it appears that
time-series models rarely explain statistically much more than halfofthe var-
iance of expectational data. (See several papers in Mincer 1969a; Aiginger
1979). The evidence suggests that economic expectations are neither mere
projections of the past nor flashes of intuition about the future but combina-
tions of both extrapolative and autonomous components. Predictions of real
growth and inflation are usually diversified and uncertain, seldom demonstra-
bly self-fulfilling. Anticipatory action is often inhibited by prior commitments
incurred in part to reduce uncertainty. Thus not all past is bygones and expec-
61. All these surveys collect largely qualitative responses (on the direction and in some cases
range, rather than the precise size, of the expected price movements). The conversion of these
data to the quantitative form required for the tests presents some difficult problems.
62. For many early forecasts of U.S. aggregate series, there is evidence of significant bias
(Mincer and Zarnowitz 1969). The most common pattern is underestimation of growth and, less
frequently, of cyclical changes (Theil 1958; Zarnowitz 1967). There are indications of adaptive
learning behavior (Mincer 1969b).
63. Indeed, Mishkin (1981a) constructs forecasts from the bond market data which fail to reject
the rationality tests for interest-rate expectations. But the concurrent bond market predictions of
inflation fail the tests. The argument that this reflects the unusual character ofthe 1960s, a period
of rising inflation, is not really persuasive. The inflation forecasts in the perhaps even more "un-
usual" 1970s seem generally worse yet. Long periods oftranquillity are hard to find.65 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
tations are not all-important. Yet they matter a great deal and are a proper
subject for empirical as well as theoretical studies.64
2.4.6 Models of Financial Instability
Speculative excesses or "manias" have attracted the attention ofcontempo-
raries and economic historians at least since the Dutch Tulip Bubble of 1625-
37. Financed by credit expansion and characterized by "overtrading" in real
or financial assets (e.g., gold, land, or securities) they have been associated
with more than two dozen major booms in business activity, often involving
many countries (Kindleberger 1978). Historically, they tended to be followed
by "panics," that is, distress selling ofthe same assets to reacquire money and
repay debt, and crashes in the prices of the now illiquid objects ofthe specu-
lation. The resulting financial crises accompanied or aggravated downturns in
the business cycle.
In asset markets, as a rule, the current price depends positively on its own
expectedrate ofchange. Expectations are influenced by outside events as well
as the "market fundamentals"-economic determinants ofthe rates ofreturn.
The markets may react to the events by adopting such price anticipations as
would drive the actual prices away from the path consistent with the funda-
mentals. In this view, accepted much more readily by practitioners than theo-
rists, anticipations of a strong market trend are occasionally capable of caus-
ing speculative "bubbles"-cumulative, even explosive, fluctuations in prices
ofselected assets.
Very recently, these ideas, long mistrusted by most contemporary econo-
mists, began to receive support from writers using rigorous techniques of
equilibrium analysis. Shiller (1981a, 1981b) concludes that stock price move-
ments are too large to be explained by an efficient-markets model which in-
corporates future dividends, capital gains, and inflation. Blanchard and Wat-
son (1982) argue that bubbles can occur in efficient markets with new entry
and no unexploited arbitrage opportunities; also, that they have potentially
strong real effects on relative asset prices, wealth, and aggregate demand.65
Much of the recent work in this area uses the overlapping-generations ap-
64. The evidence from surveys has certain important limitations and must be assessed with
caution, but the consensus of careful independent tests based on such data should be taken seri-
ously; indeed, the materials now available are rich and in need ofmuch further exploration (Tobin
1980, p. 29). Lessons from such work can usefully counter and correct the freely speculative
analysis that treats expectations as being inevitably "unobservable."
65. The problems of indeterminacy and instability of RE equilibria are now well recognized
and much studied. Conditions under which bubbles may be excluded from the RE paths of the
price level have been specified for some monetary models (e.g., Brock 1975). Tests for the Ger-
man hyperinflation ofthe early 1920s reported by Flood and Garber (1980) give no support to the
hypothesis that a price-level bubble occurred in that extreme episode. But it is easy to see that
expectations alone cannot account for a long or rapid inflation in the absence ofpersistent or very
high rates of money creation. Clearly, bubbles are much more likely in speculative markets for
financial assets.66 Chapter Two
proach due to Samuelson (1958; Kareken and Wallace 1980). Models of this
type, with markets continuously cleared by price movements, typically have
a multiplicity of RE solutions, a large proportion of which may involve fluc-
tuations prompted by arbitrary but self-fulfilling shifts in anticipations (Aza-
riadis 1981). Thus, ifthe beliefthat sunspots predict future prices were widely
held, many individuals would act on it so as to bear out their expectations.
Cass and Shell (1983) argue that RE equilibria generally can be influenced by
extrinsic uncertainty, that is, random phenomena such as "animal spirits" or
"market psychology," which do not affect the basic parameters ofthe economy
(endowments, preferences, technologies). The conditions under which this
would not be the case are so unrealistic as to be devoid of any empirical in-
terest. 66
These abstract treatments rationalize the role in financial crises of "sun-
spots," but they do not tell us how much these interacting and self-fulfilling
expectations matter. The crises are seldom isolated phenomena; rather they
form a part of some business cycles and are thus related to the monetary,
institutional, and real factors involved in these cycles. Market psychology
plays a large role in some crises, mainly the major ones.
Mild financial crises of recent U.S. history, called "credit crunches," are
associated by some observers primarily with reduced availability ofcredit, not
high interest rates (Wojnilower 1980). Credit rationing by banks is linked to
imperfect information about the borrowers' default risk (Stiglitz and Weiss
1981; Blinder and Stiglitz 1983). When banks refuse to renew their loans, the
high-risk borrowers and many small firms are unable to secure credit else-
where and are forced to curtail investment and perhaps current operations.
The retrenchment mayor may not be caused by restrictive open-market poli-
cies of the central bank. Under fractional banking, loans and deposits are
highly collinear, so it is difficult to use the data to distinguish between this
"credit" hypothesis and a "money supply" hypothesis of a downturn. Since
the early 1950s, broad credit aggregates such as the total debt of U.S. nonfi-
nancial sectors have been closely and stably related to GNP-better or not
worse than the money stock and monetary base series (B. Friedman 1983).
In several collected papers, Minsky (1982) argues that long periods ofpros-
perity interrupted only by mild recessions or slowdowns breed overconfi-
dence, excessive short-term financing by banks of long-term business proj-
ects, investment booms interacting with stock market booms, and growing
indebtedness and illiquidity. Innovative practices and new instruments are
used to increase the availability of investment finance: money should be
broadly defined and is endogenously determined. Its supply, however, be-
comes at some point inelastic as uncertainty grows and banks increasingly
66. They include (1) strong RE-unanimity of beliefs, (2) complete markets-there are mar-
kets for all types of contingent claims, and (3) unrestricted access to these markets for all agents
at all times-across the "generations." Conditions (1) and (2) are merely improbable; (3) is alto-
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deem it prudent to retrench (or monetary authorities act to constrain inflation).
The demand for credit to finance planned and progressing investment projects
nevertheless continues to rise. It takes sharp increases in interest rates and
declines in the present value ofexpected net returns on capital assets to check
and reverse the expansion in new investment. Business cash flows and profits
decline and eventually so do total sales, output, and employment. The result-
ing losses force many industrial concerns and financial intermediaries into
refinancing of debt and liquidation of assets to raise cash. Many retrench;
some fail. When a sufficiently large number of these units experience inade-
quate cash flows from current operations and declining ability to sustain debt,
a financial crisis must occur, unless the central bank intervenes, injecting suf-
ficient money into the system and preventing large bank defaults and business
failures. Ifa crisis is averted and stimulative monetary and fiscal policies con-
tinue, a mild recession may ensue but another inflationary and eventually de-
stabilizing investment boom will soon follow.
This is a disequilibrium theory with strong endogenous elements. The orig-
inating factors are real, but monetary and credit changes have much to do with
the propagation of the cycle and are primarily responsible for its worst mani-
festations (see also the summary in table 2.5). This is the opposite of some
recent theories (such as that of Lucas) which have monetary shocks and real
propagation mechanisms. Minsky's hypothesis predicts the recurrence of fi-
nancial crises and business depressions, which invites controversy. It deserves
to be carefully evaluated, but it is difficult to test (in part inevitably so since
financial crises and depressions are rare and complex events). In general
terms, however, the account provided by Minsky tends to be consistent with
the history of speculative investment booms, financial crises, and deep
depressions in the United States (Bums and Mitchell 1946, ch. 11, sec. 6;
Kindleberger 1978; Hoyt [1933] 1970). It also has interesting connections
with several diverse business cycle theories.67
2.4.7 Demand and Supply Shocks and Responses:
A Search for New Concepts
Dissatisfaction with the results obtained by using random money supply
shocks and price misperceptions prompted some economists to experiment
with different models (while retaining the basic RE methodology in most
cases). Abstracting from numerous detail, one can distinguish the following
approaches.
67. Minsky credits primarily Keynes, whom he interprets as having a dynamic analysis that
does not rely on price rigidities, but his emphasis on the instability ofcredit flows and business
debt relative to income recalls the Austrians and draws on Fisher. Some complementarity may
even exist between elements ofthe Kindleberger-Minsky hypothesis and the monetarist approach,
particularly with respect to accounting for financial crises on an international scale (Bordo 1984).
Another linkage is to the "corridor effects" suggested by Leijonhufvud: deflationary shocks large
enough to produce financial crises and waves ofbankruptcies may throw a normally stable system
into a deep depression in which disequilibrating forces prevail for some time (Howitt 1978).68 Chapter Two
Focus on Interest Rates and Related Factors
These received much attention in the literature from Wicksell and the Aus-
trians to Keynes. Monetary intervention or excesses of credit creation were
seen as causing interest rates to deviate from their equilibrium levels so that
they fail to coordinate saving and investment decisions. Inconsistencies arise
in the aggregate between the expectations ofthose who make these decisions
and the expectations of the financial intermediaries. Monetarists opposed
these ideas on the ground that investment and savings depend on the real in-
terest rates, which cannot be affected by the banking system, except transito-
rily. In the early RE models, too, interest rates had no important roles to play.
However, fluctuations in credit and interest, which have been so pronounced
in recent years, are receiving renewed attention in the literature since the late
1970s (Leijonhufvud 1981, ch. 7; Frydman and Phelps 1983, ch. 10).
This includes some new departures along the incomplete-information line
of approach. McCulloch (1977, 1981) argues that business fluctuations are
associated with unanticipated changes in interest rates that misdirect real in-
vestment decisions toward a wrong mix of capital goods and so distort the
intertemporal production process (as in the real part ofthe theories of Hayek
and Mises).68 In an equilibrium model by Grossman and Weiss (1982), ran-
dom real shocks affect productivity and the real interest rate, causing invest-
ment and output to fluctuate. Random monetary shocks affect inflation and the
nominal interest rate, with the effect of amplifying the cycle. Agents make
errors in trying to infer the ex ante values of the real rate and inflation from
the nominal rate (which includes the two) because the latter's movements con-
tain much random noise. The critical gap in information concerns the relative
rates of real return (on own compared with other investments). The model
involves only supply decisions, with the role of demand being purely pas-
sive.69
Recent empirical work suggests that output (real GNP or industrial produc-
tion) interacts with price-level indexes, comprehensive credit aggregates, in-
terest rates, and narrow money aggregates. None of these variables is defi-
nitely exogenous relative to all the others; in particular, money adds to the
68. The novel element is the stress on "misintermediation" rather than on the money-creating
function ofthe banks (the two are closely connected). Banks and other intermediaries, by borrow-
ing short and lending long, are said to mismatch asset and liability maturities and to add to the
uncertainty about interest rates by creating imbalances in their term structure. This hypothesis and
the related estimates deal only with nominal, not with real, rates, besides posing other problems
that cannot be discussed here in the available space; but the hypothesis does address an important
and long-recognized institutional aspect offinancial instability (to which the previous section also
briefly referred).
69. Investment here is equated with the process of transforming labor input into next period's
output. No durable goods are produced. The nominal shocks take the form of disturbances to
money demand. These simplifications are made to allow some difficult problems in the dynamic
equilibrium theory to be rigorously analyzed, but they also deprive the model of some highly
relevant characteristics of the modem capitalist economies, which experience business cycles.
This is, to be sure, not uncommon in the recent theoretical literature.69 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
incremental prediction of the real variables along with credit and interest
rates, but it is not predetermined or predominant (Sims 1980a; B. Friedman
1983; see also chapter 12).70
These results are interesting and may prove robust, but they should be in-
terpreted with much caution. Nominal interest rates may matter because their
changes are read as signals of changes in the stock of money and inflation.
But they may also be important in their own right as the major part ofthe true
costs ofcredit. Historically, their adjustments to inflation (and deflation) were
sufficiently sluggish and incomplete to suggest that people treated the nominal
rates as if they were adequate proxies for the real ones. Evidence going back
to the 1860s shows that this condition continued to prevail at least well into
the 1950s; only thereafter did the relationship between interest and inflation
strengthen to become rather close in the 1960s and 1970s. More recently, it
weakened again considerably.71
The ex post real interest rates, pre- and post-tax, have small cyclical varia-
tions, which makes it difficult to detect how they are correlated with move-
ments in real variables, but this is rightly seen as a problem in measurement
rather than evidence of no significant relationships (Mishkin 1981b). Real
rates rose sharply to unusually high levels in the early years of the Great
Depression and again in 1980-82, a period of severe recession and strong
disinflation. It is only reasonable to view these changes as mainly unantici-
pated and their probable net effects as seriously adverse.72 The measured real
rates are inversely correlated with lagged inflation. Increased money growth,
then, by raising inflation, lowers the real rate; but the evidence for a short-
term effect of monetary policy, independent of inflation, is mixed and weak
(Shiller 1980; Mishkin 1981b).
Focus on Real Factors
Consider two polar models. (1) Exogenous fluctuations in real investment
cause the business cycle. Banks meet the borrowers' demand for money and
the depositors' demand for money because the monetary authority provides
70. These exogeneity tests ask whether, say, the lagged values ofmoney help explain orpredict
output in a regression equation containing the lagged values of output itself and of the other
variables. This question is answered for each variable in the system in terms of all variables
included. This method of variance deconlposition or accounting for the interactions among the
"innovations" (serially uncorrelated residuals) of the series in question avoids some major short-
comings of simple distributed-lag regressions but encounters some difficult problems of its own
(see the following paragraph and chapter 12).
71. These findings refer to the United States; for the United Kingdom the corresponding relation
was much weaker throughout (see Friedman and Schwartz 1982, ch. 10). According to Summers
(1983) the impact ofinflation on interest rates has been much smaller throughout the post-World
War II period than a general equilibrium model would predict on classical assumptions, particu-
larly when properly allowing for the effective tax rates (see also Feldstein 1976a).
72. But note that the real rates stayed relatively high in 1983-84 without visibly obstructing a
vigorous recovery. Presumably, once the economy adjusted to the large changes, the smaller ones
had only weak effects.70 Chapter Two
them with the necessary reserves at any given level of interest rates. (2) Ex-
ogenous fluctuations in money supply cause the business cycle. The demand
for money adjusts continuously to the supply through changes in permanent
income associated with much larger changes in measured real income or
output.
Tobin (1970) sets the two models up so that model (1) implies a consistent
pattern of early cyclical timing for monetary growth rates or deviations from
trend, whereas (2) does not. Friedman denies that these examples cast doubt
on his views. The two debaters agree that evidence on leads and lags alone
cannot prove any hypothesis about causation (though it can disprove some);
also, that both of the above models are far from adequate. Indeed, (1) is an
oversimplification and partial distortion of Keynes, (2) of Friedman. The
widely used general IS/LM-AD/AS framework can accommodate some ofthe
ideas of some of the Keynesians and monetarists with respect to the effects
and interactions of both autonomous expenditure and monetary changes. 73
But this long-ruling paradigm was designed for comparative statics ofexoge-
nous interventions with a stationary environment; its adaptation to dynamic
and expectational processes confronts a host ofdifficult and unresolved prob-
lems.
Earlier sections contain several diverse illustrations ofrecent work oriented
toward nonmonetary (real, psychological, institutional) explanations of mac-
roeconomic instability. Other such efforts relate to the old idea (preceding
Keynes, though often associated with him) that both money and real activity
respond to the common factor of fluctuations in aggregate demand and the
corresponding changes in interest rates and the value ofexisting assets. Sims
(1980a), referring to Tobin (1970), urges the development ofa stochastic ver-
sion ofthis theory. Some new historical studies also emphasize the importance
of factors other than the independent influence on business conditions of
changes in the stock ofmoney. 74
73. IS and LM relate output and interest rates; AD and AS (aggregate demand and supply
functions) relate output and the price level. It is assumed that the IS and AD curves slope down-
ward; the LM and AS curves upward. The Keynesian view is often associated with relatively steep
IS and flat LM; the monetarist view with relatively flat IS and steep LM curves. But this interpre-
tation is by no means universally acceptable; even if accepted, it leaves open other important
issues in the controversy. The IS/LM-AD/AS model evolved from Hicks 1935, 1937, through a
long series ofwritings including, notably, Patinkin [1954] 1965.
74. Thus Temin (1976) attributes the 1929 downturn to a decline in '"autonomous" spending
(interestingly, mainly in consumption and exports rather than investment). For monetarist coun-
terarguments, see the essays by Schwartz and Brunner (Brunner 1981); for a view that both money
and investment (and other spending) mattered, see R. 1. Gordon and J. Wilcox in the same vol-
ume.
King and Plosser (1984) examine the possibility that the positive correlation between the rates
ofgrowth in output and monetary aggregates reflects, in large part, the causal chain running from
business activity to '"inside money," that is, bank deposits.
Bemanke (1983) produces evidence linking the sharp drop in output during the early 1930s to
the reduced quality and higher real costs ofcredit intermediation services, a result of the institu-
tional weakness and crises ofbanking.71 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
It remains to take note of the most radical reactions against monetarist and
monetary shock theories by some strong believers in general-equilibrium
modeling and the neutrality ofmoney. Here the main idea is that unanticipated
changes in tastes and technology cause intersectoral shifts ofhuman and phys-
ical capital associated with much friction and temporary idleness. Unemploy-
ment generated by a large number of partly independent shocks to different
sectors will persist for considerable time because rapid transfers of resources
are costly, the more so the greater the specialization of the production factors
(Black 1982).75 But changes in tastes and technology will tend to penalize
some sectors and benefit others, causing numerous shifts in relative prices and
outputs; they may occasionally have significant net favorable or adverse ef-
fects on growth but can hardly be responsible for recurrent sequences of ex-
pansions and contractions in aggregate economic activity.
The most restrictive formal model of purely real "business cycles" (Long
and Plosser 1983) abstracts not only from money and government but also
from technological change, durable goods, and adjustment costs; it assumes
RE, complete information, and stable preferences. There are random shocks
to outputs of the many commodities, each of which can be either consumed
or used as input in the production of any other commodity during each unit
period. The optimal allocation rule is such that when the ith output is unex-
pectedly high (low), the simultaneous inputs of i in all its productive uses are
increased (reduced). It is shown that this works to propagate the effects ofthe
output shocks both forward in time and across the sectors ofthe economy. The
model is intended to serve as a benchmark for evaluating the importance in
actual business cycles of the many factors it omits, but it admittedly presents
serious problems and the approach itselfis questionable.76
Focus on the Causes and Effects ofContractual Wage and Price Setting
Recent literature is much concerned with the specification ofeconomic rea-
sons for the existence of explicit or implicit multiperiod contracts that limit
the flexibility of wages and prices in response to unanticipated shifts in de-
mand and supply.77 The "contract-theoretic" models based on this work drop
75. This recalls the Hhorizontal maladjustments," which were treated as a potentially important
aggravating factor, but not a prime cause, in classical writings (see sec. 2.3.1).
76. In particular, the model has constant employment of labor while the commodity outputs
fluctuate. Simulations based on a 1967 input-output table for six major industry divisions result in
output series that show considerable comovements and two complete quasi cycles in runs of 100-
unit periods of undefined length. It is not clear whether the fluctuations due to the output shocks
are separable from those due to other factors.
77. One hypothesis is that fixed-wage, variable employment contracts sell risk-averse workers
partial insurance against the variability of their incomes (Baily 1974; D. F. Gordon 1974; Aza-
riadis 1975). Another is that labor contracts or understandings treat incomes as normal returns on
the loyalty and efficiency of long-term employees and protect large investments in firm-specific
human capital (Hall 1980a; Okun 1981, chs. 2 and 3). Steady pricing policies are used to reduce
the costs of shopping and attract steady customers (Okun 1981, ch. 4). In sum, contracts are
attempts to deal economically with a variety of Htransaction" (information, negotiation, adjust-72 Chapter Two
the assumption of market clearing and the reliance on price errors and inter-
temporal substitution effects. They restore the changes in aggregate demand
to their old role as a direct determinant of fluctuations in the real aggregates
by delaying the adjustments in the contractually predetermined wages and the
wage-related prices.
The main models ofthis type are monetarist in the original sense ofrelating
short-run fluctuations in output to monetary policy operating via changes in
demand. This is so even where the policy is based on a fixed feedback rule
known to the public, because the money stock can be changed more fre-
quently than the wage is renegotiated (Phelps and Taylor 1977; Fischer 1977a;
Taylor 1980a). The authors work with staggered contracts in which wages are
linked to expectations that are rational (i.e., model-consistent; sec. 2.4.5).
Fischer relates wages to price-level forecasts; his contracts are (frustrated) at-
tempts to keep real wages from falling in the face ofinflationary policy. Taylor
relates wages to other past and anticipated wage settlements; the degree of
inertia in these interrelations helps explain the persistence of unemployment.
These models have attracted much attention and criticism. 78
According to the "credibility" hypothesis (Fellner 1976, 1980), a consistent
policy ofadhering to preannounced moderate money growth targets can deter
inflationary wage and price setting and reduce instability in the long run. A
correlate is that unions will push for higher wages in labor contract negotia-
tions and business will respond by raising prices if both parties expect the
monetary authorities to "ratify" their decisions through accommodative poli-
cies. This view differs in some important respects from monetarism and the
newer RE and contract theories, but it also incorporates some of their ele-
ments. It recognizes that, in practice, systematic policy components are often
weak and only belatedly detectable (Sims 1982). It is related to the idea of
"coordination failures" (Leijonhufvud 1981) in a game-theoretic form: it is
possible for expectational impasses to develop, that is, a recession-cum-
inflation may continue while the central bank waits for wage demands to mod-
erate and business and labor wait for a resumption of monetary expansion
(Phelps 1981). All this certainly raises issues that are very important in deal-
ing with inflation; how much bearing it has here depends on how strongly
policy-induced changes in monetary growth and inflation influence business
cycles. The notion that such changes are the principal cause of the cycles
(which many now accept as if it were self-evident) is not supported by the
ment) costs in the face ofprice instability and general uncertainty. For surveys, see R. J. Gordon
1976; Barro 1981a.
78. The issues include the consistency of the assumed contract features with rational behavior
(Barro 1977a; Fischer 1977b) and the reasons why wages are not fully indexed under anticipated
inflation (Brunner and Meltzer 1977). For a detailed critique ofFischer and Taylor and a proposed
improved model, see McCallum 1982. For some evidence and further discussion, see Taylor
1980b and 1983.73 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
long record ofcyclical instability coexisting with alternating extended periods
of inflations and deflations. It is also countered by the argument that business
contractions, whatever their causes, have deflationary or disinflationary ef-
fects. 79
Most recent RE models, including those ofthe contract-theoretic type, con-
sider only one determinant of aggregate demand, the real money balances,
and concentrate on the effects of monetary policy. But shifts in aggregate de-
mand may be due to real and expectational as well as monetary factors. They
may reflect the instability ofany ofthe major expenditure components ofreal
GNP. Neither theory nor evidence supports the focus on nominal demand
shocks and real supply shocks alone. In recent times, at least, consumer capi-
tal outlays have been no less cyclical than business investment (R. J. Gordon
and Veitch 1986). Indeed, new models of consumption which embrace RE
have consumers respond promptly and strongly to any new information that
revises their forecasts of future income. This in itself would tend to increase
the sensitivity ofconsumption, and hence ofincome, to unanticipated changes
in aggregate demand or "autonomous expenditures" (compared with the ear-
lier models which used adaptive rather than rational expectations in the cal-
culation of permanent income). The increased instability on the demand side
is offset only when the REH is combined with speedy clearing ofthe markets
and a highly stable and inelastic aggregate supply curve, that is, in the new-
classical equilibrium models (Bilson 1980, pp. 279-83; and comment by
Hall, p. 301).80
2.5 Conclusion: The Needed Synthesis
Business cycles belong to the history of modem economies with interde-
pendent markets, free enterprise, and private ownership offinancial assets and
capital goods. They developed in the era ofgreat growth ofindustry, banking,
and credit. They are varied and changing, even while retaining their general
characteristics ofpersistence and pervasiveness as well as specific regularities
ofamplitude and timing. All this was long recognized by serious scholars and
careful observers with abiding interest in the subject.
For a long time, too, there was a substantial consensus among these econ-
omists that business cycles have mainly endogenous explanations involving
recurrent fluctuations in interrelated monetary and real variables, prices and
quantities, expectations and realizations. The theories tended to agree on the
79. None ofthis, ofcourse, is to deny that the inflationary bias ofgovernment actions and the
reactions to it have economic consequences of great importance; what is questioned is the view
(going far beyond the credibility hypothesis) that these consequences include the business cycle.
80. Many interesting theoretical and empirical studies of the consumption function have ap-
peared in recent years, but the implications ofthis work for business cycles remain to be worked
out (Hall 1978; Davidson and Hendry 1981; Blanchard and Wyplosz 1981; Flavin 1981; Bernanke
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cast and setting, disagreeing principally on which factors should play star and
which supporting roles. Chance and outside disturbances were left behind the
stage, interfering with and modifying the action but not determining its main
course. The cycle had plural causes and effects; it produced and resolved its
own stresses and resources, nationally and internationally. Few attributed it to
any single factor or defect, and few believed that it can be eliminated by any
single, low-cost type ofpolicy intervention or institutional reform.
The 1930s convinced many that the economy is not merely cyclical but
depression prone. The instability of profits, investment, and credit (old con-
cerns) attracted renewed attention. In the 1940s and 1950s, however, there
was a rise of interest in the dynamics of multiplier-accelerator interaction
which yielded highly aggregative and purely endogenous models of poten-
tially unstable output fluctuations. The monetary, financial, and expectational
aspects ofthe cycle were largely neglected. Soon, strong reactions developed
against this one-sided conception. One took the form of stochastic, dynami-
cally stable mathematical models. This greatly influenced macroeconometric
models which emphasized the destabilizing role ofrandom shocks and exog-
enous factors.
The other reaction against theories of endogenous instability was monetar-
ism. Its targets included not only the Keynesian models ofaggregate demand,
with fluctuating but often weak investment and a major role for fiscal policies
to combat unemployment, but also the older models with unstable credit-
investment interactions. Fluctuations in monetary growth attributed to erratic
or misguided policies were made primarily responsible for disturbing the ba-
sically stable private economy and creating "business cycles." The real, finan-
cial, and expectational factors received little attention.
The natural-rate and rational expectations hypotheses, plus the discourag-
ing record ofthe 1970s, led to new hopes for a program ofstudy with a grand
design: to reconcile business cycles with the postulates of the competitive
general-equilibrium theory in its modem dynamic form. The initial approach
relied upon random monetary shocks, price misperceptions, and intertem-
poral substitution oflabor. However, critical analyses and tests soon cast seri-
ous doubts on this construction and thereby on the underlying premises,
mainly that of flexible prices continuously clearing all markets. No convinc-
ing remedy could be provided by adaptation of familiar elements of older
disequilibrium theories such as the accelerator and lags due to costs ofadjust-
ments in the stocks ofproduction factors.
Some equilibrium theorists questioned the importance of the disturbances
to money supply and tried to explain business cycles in real terms only. Their
RE models are more restrictive yet. They consist of supply reactions of a
"representative" producer-consumer to productivity or input-output shocks.
The environment is purely competitive or of a Robinson Crusoe type. There
is little or no evidence to support these models.
Contract theories, designed to explain why most wages and prices are tem-75 Recent Work on Business Cycles in Historical Perspective
porarily "sticky," formed the basis ofvery different models in which aggregate
demand fluctuations are restored to their usual prominence. Other work, also
using the currently favored RE methodology, turned to factors with a long
history of service in business cycle models: uncertainty and shifts in "market
psychology," interest-rate misperceptions or maladjustments, and long invest-
ment gestation periods.
There is not much empirical validation that random shocks ofall kinds play
as large a role in business cycles as has been attributed to them in recent
literature. The weight of exogenous policy factors, too, seems more often
than not overstated. The theoretical interest in self-sustaining cycles, or ele-
ments thereof, declined in times when economic events and thought favored a
revival ofthe faith in the private sector's capacity for stable growth. New work
in this area, therefore, has been limited, but it still produced some interesting
and significant results.
The most disturbing aspect ofwhat must be viewed as the new mainstream
literature (the RE models) is its increasing fragmentation in the face ofvarious
theoretical problems and recalcitrant facts. The ruling research strategy in
these studies is to demonstrate for each particular model that one or more of
the selected factors can contribute to fluctuations in total output or employ-
ment, while recognizing that others can do so as well. The authors are mainly
concerned with theoretical possibilities rather than with explanations of what
actually happens. There is in general little regard for how the pieces fit each
other or the "real world." The variety ofthe models is only loosely limited by
the ingenuity of the theorists, but many of the offered hypotheses are not
tested and some are not testable. Small linear models are favored because of
their mathematical tractability in the equilibrium RE framework, but this cer-
tainly does not mean that larger and/or nonlinear systems are somehow in-
ferior. The criterion ofconformity to stylized facts would, in fact, suggest the
opposite.
As a matter ofsimple logic, ifeach ofa number of models is indeed valid,
then it should in principle be possible to integrate them and improve the
theory. Ofcourse, this is easier said than done, but when each model is treated
in isolation, there is little chance for the job to be ever seriously attacked. The
conclusion reached here, then, is that a movement toward a synthesis of the
tested and nonfalsified hypotheses is urgently needed if real progress is to be
made in our understanding ofbusiness cycles.
In this view, research in this area will profit most from the confrontation of
testable hypotheses with a broad range ofevidence on stylized facts and from
efforts to combine those hypotheses that survive the tests. This assigns high
priorities to the work on (1) the consolidation and updating of findings from
the historical and statistical business cycle studies and (2) using the results to
eliminate those elements ofthe extant theories that are definitely inconsistent
with the evidence and to improve the modeling of the other elements. This
strategy could lead us away from the proliferation of models which give lop-76 Chapter Two
sided stress to either the monetary or the real factors, either the supply or the
demand behavior, either random shocks or purely endogenous movements;
instead, we would be working toward a better comprehension of how these
forces interact. As was recognized early by the "classics," the sharp dichoto-
mies and monocausal theories tend to be invalidated by experience.
Also, the hypothesis that business cycles are all alike would itself be tested
in the course of this research. It is important to know not only what the com-
mon core of the cyclical process has been for the U.S. economy in recent
times but also how it may have changed historically and how it differs from
similar processes elsewhere. The knowledge is necessary for an assessment of
the temporal and spatial reference points of business cycle theory. (For the
most recent work on these problems, see R. J. Gordon, 1986a).
We have witnessed a period ofgreat intellectual ferment, activity, and con-
troversy in the theory of macroeconomic fluctuations and policies, but the
debate seems to be growing less heated lately, and some signs of a future
rapprochement can be discerned. The present may be a good time to ponder
the needed synthesis.